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The performance of the Hungarian second pillar since inception has been mixed. This is 
partly due to a less than satisfactory support for the 1997 pension reform, conservative 
fund portfolio distributions, the hybrid nature of the mandatory pension fund system, the 
segmented nature of the market in terms of costs, and a less than aggressive commitment 
on the part of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority to a low-cost, transparent, 
and competitive equilibrium. In the accumulation phase, the authorities would need to 
further promote transparency and comparability of information on costs and investment 
performance, facilitate migration to lower cost funds, and more generally promote 
competition. The regulatory framework of the payout phase needs to be overhauled 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
1.       In July 1997, the Hungarian Parliament approved the first systemic pension reform 
in Central and Eastern Europe.  The reform involved several parametric changes to the old 
public pay-as-you-go scheme and the introduction of a mixed pension system comprising 
a downsized mandatory public scheme as a first pillar, a new system of mandatory and 
privately-managed schemes as a second pillar, and the old voluntary and privately 
managed schemes as a third pillar.
1 The critical component of the systemic reform was the 
introduction of the mandatory pension funds (MPF) as second pillar. 
2.       Participation in the new second pillar was made mandatory for new entrants to the 
labor force after July 1, 1998, and voluntary for all remaining workers.  The new second 
pillar started operating in January 1, 1998, and by 2004 MPF assets had increased to 4 
percent of GDP.  This compares with assets of 2.6 percent of GDP managed by the 
voluntary pension funds that had been operating since 1993 (the third pillar).
2 
3.       This paper analyzes the structure and performance of the MPF system in Hungary, 
as well as its regulatory and supervisory framework.  The analysis of the MPF system in 
Hungary is important for several reasons.  The second pillar in Hungary is already larger 
than the third pillar, despite having been created five years later, and should become much 
larger in the coming decades when maturity is reached.  Moreover, when the transition to 
the new system is completed, the second pillar should provide about 30 percent of the 
retirement income of all Hungary pensioners.  In contrast, the third pillar plays only a 
complementary function in the Hungarian pension system.  While this function is also 
important, the performance of the third pillar will not affect the welfare of the Hungarian 
retired population to the same extent as the second pillar.   
4.       Finally, a performance assessment of the Hungarian second pillar is also 
interesting due to the rather unique way in which the MPF system has been designed.  The 
private pension sector of most countries is either based on closed occupational funds, 
legally structured as non-profit trusts or foundations with boards, or it is based on open 
funds, without boards, and managed by profit-oriented pension fund managers.  The 
former model is prevalent in Western Europe while the latter model is prevalent in most 
reforming countries in Eastern Europe, as well as most Latin American countries.  By 
contrast, MPFs in Hungary are open funds which operate as non-profit mutual 
associations with a board of directors and without minimum capital requirements. 
5.       The non-profit nature of the mutual association and the lack of a minimum capital 
requirement have meant that most MPFs had to be sponsored either by a large employer or 
by a financial group, in order to meet the high start-up costs.  Today, the MPF sponsor 
controls de facto the board and therefore the fund policies.  This has resulted in a 
segmented pension system with participating funds grouped in three main groups.  The 
first and the largest group of funds is sponsored (and controlled) by financial institutions.  
The second group of funds is sponsored by large employers, mostly utility companies.  
                                                 
1 The voluntary schemes had been introduced in 1993, long before the 1997 reform. 
2 Palacios and Rocha (1998) and Rocha and Vittas (2002) examine the Hungarian reform in detail.  Matits 
(2002 and 2004) provide an analysis of the second and third pillars.  
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The third group of funds seems to be composed of independent MPFs.  The funds 
sponsored by financial institutions account for about 85 percent of total assets, despite 
charging higher fees.  One of the main challenges faced by Hungarian regulators is to 
reduce the current degree of market segmentation, taking advantage of the presence of 
low-cost funds to improve competition and reduce costs and fees for all participants.   
6.       This paper is structured as follows.  Section II analyzes the industrial organization 
of the Hungarian MPFs by type of sponsor.  Section III, IV and V provide an analysis of 
the performance of the MPF system in terms of asset growth, portfolio composition and 
investment return, and fees, respectively.  Section VI examines the links between pension 
reform and capital market development.  Section VII examines the key regulatory issues 
in the accumulation and payout phases.  Conclusions and policy recommendations follow. 
II.   THE STRUCTURE OF THE SECOND PILLAR 
7.       The second pillar started operating in January 1998, with 38 MPFs initially 
licensed by the Pension Fund Supervision Agency.  The Pension Supervisor was 
integrated in the year 2000 into the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA).
3 
Table 1 reports summary indicators of the evolution of the MPF system between 1998 and 
2004.  At the end of 2004, there were 18 MPFs operating in Hungary, managing the 
accounts of 2.4 million members (more than half of the labor force) and assets of 4 
percent of GDP.  The second pillar manages a larger portion of assets than the third pillar.  
It also covers more than twice as many members. 
8.       The second pillar has always been very concentrated, with the six largest MPFs 
accounting for more than 80 percent of total assets.  Nevertheless, the reduction in the 
number of MPFs did not contribute to an increase in concentration since the MPFs that 
left the market (mostly through mergers or acquisitions) were very small.  By contrast, the 
consolidation in the third pillar was accompanied by an increase in concentration.  In 2004 
there are still 75 voluntary pension funds in operation, from the 315 in 1998. 
Table 1: Summary Data on the Structure of the Second and Third Pillars 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Second  Pillar         
Number  of  funds  38 39  - 18 18 18 18 
Total Assets (% of GDP)  0.3  0.8  1.3  1.9  2.5  3.0  4.0 
Number  of  members  (000)  1,347 2,064 2,193 2,253 2,214 2,304 2,402 
Share of 6 largest funds (%)  83  84  84  86  87  -  83 
Third  Pillar         
Number  of  funds  315 - - -  82 -  75 
Total Assets (% of GDP)  1.0  1.4  1.7  2.0  2.2  2.4  2.6 
Number  of  members  (000)  940 1,008 1,081 1,153 1,179  -  - 
Share of 15 largest funds (%)  47  59  71  74  80  -  - 
Source: HFSA. 
9.       The relatively small number of funds and the concentrated market structure are not 
features unique to the Hungarian second pillar.  As a matter of fact, in other reforming 
                                                 
3 See Section VII.  
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countries in Central Europe and Latin America, the number of institutions operating in the 
second pillar is even smaller, as shown in Table 2.   
Table 2:  Number of Second Pillar Funds in Latin America and Central Europe, 2004 
Central Europe  Latin America 
Hungary 18 Argentina 12 
Bulgaria 8  Bolivia  2 
Croatia 7  Chile 6 
Estonia 6  Colombia  6 
Kazakhstan 13  Costa  Rica 8 
Latvia 5  El  Salvador  2 
Poland 16 Mexico  13 
   Peru  4 
   Uruguay  4 
Source: HFSA, AIOS, FIAP  
10.       What are possibly unique in Hungary are the segmented nature of the second pillar 
and the continued existence of smaller institutions.  Table 3 shows the large difference 
between the smallest and the largest institution in the Hungarian second pillar, whether the 
difference is measured in assets, members, or contributions. 
Table 3: Market Structure of the Hungarian Second Pillar, 2004 
 Assets  Members  Contributions 
  (HUF 000,000)  (unit)  (HUF 000,000) 
Smallest MPF  1,003  2,840  320.3 
Largest MPF  224,161  681,231  57,267.8 
Average MPF  48,997  133,456  11,851.4 
Market Total  881,944  2,402,210  213,324.9 
Share of Largest Six MPFs  83%  87%  83% 
Herfindahl Index  1,491  1,638  1,510 
Source: HFSA raw data. 
11.       The co-existence of large and small institutions is to a large extent due to the 
diversified nature MPF sponsors.  Table 4 shows how the ten MPFs sponsored by 
financial institutions tend to be much larger.  Average assets, contributions and members 
in this first group are much higher than for the other two groups.
4 The five MPFs 
sponsored by large employers have between 8,000 and 20,000 members, mostly 
employees of the sponsoring company or the group of companies in the sector (i.e., the 
electricity sector).  The three MPFs in the third group have on average 60,000 members, 
although there is a large difference between the smallest and the largest MPF in this 
group. 
12.       The MPFs in the first group account for 87 percent of the market, however 
measured, reflecting the profit oriented nature of the sponsor and the more aggressive 
marketing tactics.  The MPFs sponsored by employers or considered to be independent 
represent only around 5 and 8 percent of the market, respectively.  These MPFs are open 
to members who are not employees of the sponsor(s), and most of them would actually 
welcome an increase in membership as a means to reduce average operating costs.  
                                                 
4 However, the smallest MPF belongs to this group.    
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However, the sponsorship in these cases does not have a profit motive, and therefore 
neither the MPFs nor the sponsors maintain a sales force designed to attract more 
members.   
Table 4: Second Pillar Market Structure by Type of Sponsor, 2004 
Type of  Assets  Members  Contributions 
Sponsor  HUF 000  (unit)  HUF 000 
Min 1,003,353  9,141  347,000 
Max 224,161,495  681,231  57,267,822 
Average 76,904,851  214,356  18,605,398 
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% of Market  8%  8%  8% 
Source: HFSA raw data. 
13.       The MPFs sponsored by financial institutions typically outsource asset 
management and administration to other specialized companies within the same financial 
group.  The other MPFs usually outsource these services as well, sometimes to the same 
companies, although there are MPFs sponsored by employers that manage their assets 
internally.  When asset management is outsourced, the asset management company 
typically charges much lower fees to MPFs outside the financial group.  There is a marked 
segmentation in terms of fees that has not translated into increased switching by members 
from high fee funds to low fee funds.  As noted below, this is due in part to the lack of 
readily comparable information on returns and fees until recently. 
14.       Finally, arrangements for revenue collection have remained deficient.  Individual 
MPFs deal with many employers, including thousands of small and medium enterprises.  
As a result, the industry has been considering the creation of a single company specialized 
in revenue collection, and owned by all the MPFs. 
III.   PERFORMANCE OF THE SECOND PILLAR: GROWTH 
15.       Membership in the second pillar grew rapidly in the first years of operation, as 
shown in Figure 1.  The initial jump in membership reflected the high rate of voluntary 
switching of younger workers which had already rights under the old system, especially 
workers under 40 years of age.  In the following years, membership was expected to 
increase at lower but steady rates, in line with the flow of new entrants to the labor force.   
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However, in 2001 and 2002, membership stagnated and even declined a little, as result of 
the lack of official support to the reform.  The 1998/2002 Fidesz administration did not 
support the 1997 pension reform and reverted some of the transition rules – the 
contribution rate was not increased from 6 to 8 percent as planned, membership of new 
entrants became voluntary and workers were allowed to switch back to the pure PAYG 
system.  The original rules were restored with the return of the Socialist Government in 
mid-2002, leading to a slow but steady increase in membership since that time, in line 
with the original reform plans.
5 
16.       In 2004, second pillar assets amounted to about 4 percent of GDP, as previously 
shown in Table 1.  Although the second pillar has surpassed the third pillar in size, it is 
still small by international comparison.  As shown in Table 5, the ratio of second pillar 
assets to GDP in Hungary is lower than other countries in Latin America and Central 
Europe with the same period of implementation, and even lower than younger pension 
systems. Second pillar assets in Hungary have grown at a modest rate of about 0.5 percent 
of GDP per year, as shown in Table 6, a slower pace of growth than the one projected at 
the time of the reform. 
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Source: HFSA 
17.       In order to gain further insights into the causes of the slow growth of assets, the 
changes in the ratio of pension assets of GDP were tracked by estimating each of its four 
components: the flow of contributions, asset returns, fees charged, and the growth of 
GDP.  The first two components increase the ratio by increasing the stock of assets, while 
the third and fourth components decrease the ratio by decreasing the stock of assets and 
increasing the denominator, respectively.  Appendix A describes the methodology used 
for estimating these components in the absence of flow of funds data. 
                                                 
5 Reform reversals also affected the PAYG component of the pension system.  The rate of contribution to 
the PAYG is 4.5 percentage points lower than the levels envisaged by the reform and may be lowered 
further by 2 percentage points in 2007 and 2009.  The government also granted a 13
th monthly pension to 
retirees to compensate for the Swiss indexation introduced with the reform (Orbán and Palotai, 2005).  
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Table 5:  Second Pillar Assets in Hungary and Other Reforming Countries (% of GDP) 
Country  First Year of Operation  At 7
th Year  2004 
Hungary 1998  4.0  4.0 
Argentina 1994  7.1  12.0 
Bolivia 1997  20.9  20.5 
Chile 1981  13.5  59.1 
Colombia 1994  -  10.3 
Costa Rica  2001  -  2.7 
El Salvador  1998  13.7  13.7 
Mexico 1997  5.7  5.8 
Peru 1993  4.1  11.0 
Poland 1999  -  8.0 
Uruguay 1996  9.3  16.1 
Source: HFSA, AIOS 
18.       As shown in Table 6, the slow growth of the ratio of pension assets to GDP in 
Hungary has been primarily due to the slow initial growth of contributions and the poor 
return performance in the first years of implementation.  The flow of contributions 
remained basically stagnant in 2000 – 2002, and only started accelerating in 2003 and 
2004, especially the latter year.  The contribution of asset returns should also have 
increased during the whole period of implementation, in line with the increase in assets, 
but also remained small and stagnant during most of the period due to low rates of return 
in most years, as examined in more detail in Section IV.  Operating fees did not subtract 
too much value from assets but have been increasing steadily.  This is a trend that is cause 
for concern, as noted in Section V. 
 
Table 6: Sources of Growth of Pension Assets over GDP, 1998 – 2004 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Assets (% of GDP)  0.29  0.79  1.33  1.91  2.47  3.02  3.97 
Change (% of GDP)  -  0.50  0.54  0.57  0.56  0.56  0.95 
         
Sources (% of GDP):  -  0.47  0.52  0.53  0.51  0.63  0.94 
  Contributions  0.27 0.49 0.61 0.66 0.68 0.87 1.06 
  Asset  returns  - 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.27 
 Fees and charges  -  -0.03  -0.04  -0.06  -0.07  -0.08  -0.10 
  GDP  growth  - -0.06 -0.15 -0.19 -0.26 -0.28 -0.30 
Source: Appendix A. 
 
19.       The slow growth of contributions to the second pillar was due to several factors, 
including the failure to increase the contribution rate according to the original plans, the 
stagnation of second pillar membership in 2000 – 2002, the decrease in the contribution 
ceiling relative to the average covered wage, and the relatively low covered wage bill in 
Hungary.  As shown in Table 7, the contribution rate was maintained at 6 percent until 
2001, and only increased with the return of the socialist government in 2002.  The base of 
the contribution to the second pillar stagnated at about 10 – 11 percent of GDP in the same 
period, reflecting not only the stagnant membership in 2000 – 2002, but also the failure to 
increase the contribution ceiling in line with the increase in the covered wage.  Finally, the  
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covered wage bill in Hungary (the total base of contributions to the pension system, 
including the first and second pillars) decreased sharply during the late 1980s and early 
1990s due to evasion, and has recovered only slightly in recent years.
6 
20.       The second pillar grew at a faster rate in 2004, due to the increase in contributions 
and a much better rate of return.  The increase in contributions was in turn due to the 
increase in the contribution rate, the continued increase in membership and the increase in 
the contribution ceiling.  The future growth of the second pillar will be influenced to a 
large extent by government policies.  Sustaining a high growth of assets will require 
maintaining the contribution rate at the current levels, keeping the contribution ceiling at 
the current level of 2.5 times the average wage, maintaining the rules of transition to the 
new pension system, contributing to adequate returns through the development of new 
financial instruments, and containing costs and fees. 
Table 7: Evolution of Second Pillar Contributions, 1998 – 2004 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Contributions (% of GDP)  0.27 0.49 0.61 0.66 0.68  0.87  1.06
    
Contribution rate (%)  6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0  7.0  8.0
Contribution base (% of GDP)  4.6 8.1 10.1 11.0 11.4  12.4  13.2
    
Determinants of contribution base:     
 Membership (thousands)  1,347 2,064 2,193 2,253 2,214  2,304  2,402
 Contribution ceiling/Average covered wage  - 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6  -  2.5
 Covered wage bill (% of GDP)  22.1 22.4 22.2 23.5 23.9  24.2  -
Memo item:     
Contribution base/Covered Wage Bill  20.7 36.1 45.7 46.9 47.5  52.4  -
Source: HFSA raw data. 
21.       A recovery of the covered wage bill would also contribute to larger contributions 
and more rapid growth of the second pillar.  As shown in Table 7, the base of 
contributions to the second pillar has been growing in line with the increase in 
membership, and is now more than half of the covered wage bill.  At the end of the 
transition, when all contributors are enrolled in the new pension system, the base of 
contributions to the second pillar will be the same as the covered wage bill, and the 
growth of the second pillar will depend on the growth of the covered wage bill itself.  It is 
possible that the covered wage bill will recover to the levels prevailing in the late 1980s 
(about 33 – 34 percent of GDP) because these are the levels consistent with Hungary’s per 
capita income and the ones observed in neighboring countries, but this will require more 
efforts to address tax evasion and may take a decade or more to be achieved. 
IV.   PERFORMANCE OF THE SECOND PILLAR:  PORTFOLIOS AND INVESTMENT RETURN 
MPFs have maintained a conservative investment policy since the start of the second pillar 
in 1998.  As shown in  
                                                 
6 The covered wage bill in Hungary declined from 32 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 22 percent of GDP in 
the mid-1990s (Palacios and Rocha (1998) and Rocha and Vittas (2002)).  By comparison, the covered wage 
bill is 33 percent of GDP in Slovakia and the Czech Republic and 42 percent of GDP in Slovenia.  
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22.       Table 8, Government securities accounted for 73 percent of the portfolio in 2004, a 
high share considering that the system has been operating for seven years already.  Direct 
equity holdings account for less than 10 percent of the total, and holdings of bonds issued 
by corporations and financial institutions are extremely small.  The only noticeable change 
in the portfolio is the increase in the holdings of investment notes and other assets.  
Investment notes are actually mutual fund shares, 80 percent of which are invested in 
equity.  Therefore, direct and indirect equity holdings amount to 15 percent of the total, 
which is still a modest share. 
23.       Other assets amount to about 8 percent of the portfolio and are dominated by 
mortgage bonds.  The share of mortgage bonds in the portfolio is also low by comparison 
with other OECD countries – this is a popular asset class for pension funds in most OECD 
countries, due to its attractive return-risk characteristics, good liquidity, and relatively 
long durations.  However, the prospects in this area look somewhat brighter, because the 
rapid development of the market for mortgage bonds has been one of the most 
encouraging and promising developments in the Hungarian capital market since the start 
of the pension reform.  Finally, the share of foreign assets looks small, considering the 
openness and the relatively small size of the Hungarian economy. 
Note that this type of conservative portfolio has also been observed in most other 
reforming countries.  As shown in  
24.       Table 8, the share of Government bonds in pension fund portfolios exceeds 60 
percent in most cases, and the share of equity and foreign assets tend to be very small.  
The experience of most countries tends to be very different from the well known Chilean 
case, where pension funds started investing in private sector instruments in the early 
stages, firstly through holdings of mortgage bonds and other mortgage-backed securities, 
and subsequently through investments in equity, corporate and infrastructure bonds, and 
also some private equity.  More recently, Chilean funds started holding large amounts of 
foreign assets, mostly foreign equity. 
25.       The lack of fiscal support during the transition to the new system may explain the 
different experiences of Hungary on the one side, and Chile and many reforming countries 
on the other side.  Chile undertook a fiscal adjustment that largely offset the revenue 
losses to the second pillar, promoting an increase in national savings and opening room 
for investments in private instruments already in the first years of reform implementation.
7  
By contrast, in most other countries fiscal policy has not been supportive, resulting to a 
large extent on a debt-financed transition and relatively large issues of Government bonds, 
which ended up in the portfolios of pension funds.  The importance of this fiscal/macro 
factor explaining portfolio compositions is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the high 
correlation between the share of Government bonds in portfolios and the ratio of 
Government debt to GDP in several Latin American countries. 
 
                                                 
7 Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) provide an analysis of the macroeconomic effects of the Chilean 
pension reform.  Rocha (2006) examines the structure and performance of Chile’s second pillar.    
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Table 8: Portfolio Composition of MPFs (% of total), 1998 – 2004 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 
Cash  10.8 2.8 1.3 1.1 3.3 0.7  0.6 
Time  Deposits/CDs  3.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.4  0.5 
Government  securities  76.7 83.4 77.6 80.0 68.0 69.9  72.7 
Direct  Equity  6.6 9.8  14.8  11.6 8.9 9.3  7.8 
Corporate  and  FI  Bonds  1.7 1.7 2.3 3.0 4.2 3.0  1.7 
Investment  notes  0.3 1.7 2.6 2.3 7.1 7.2  8.2 
Other  0.4 0.3 1.3 1.9 7.8 9.5  8.5 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
M e m o :           
Est.  Total Equity  6.8  11.2  16.7  13.4  14.6  15.1  14.4 
Est.    Foreign  Assets  3.5 5.6 8.3 6.7 7.3 7.5  7.9 
Source: HFSA 
 








Institutions  Equity  Foreign 
Assets 
   7
th  
Year  2004  7
th  
Year  2004  7
th 
Year  2004  7
th 
Year  2004 
Hungary  1998  72.7 72.7 2.2 2.2  14.4 14.4 7.9 7.9
Argentina  1994  56.0 62.0 15.6 6.6 12.3  12.7  4.5 10.3
Bolivia  1997  64.1 67.5 7.3 5.6 8.6  7.5 1.7 1.5
Chile  1981  41.4 18.7 49.4 29.5 6.2 42.8 0.0  27.2
Colombia  1994  - 48.5 - 16.6 -  6.2 -  6.7
Costa  Rica  2001  - 73.1 - 14.2 -  0.1 -  0.0
El  Salvador  1998  83.5 83.5 10.5 10.5 0.2  0.2 0.0 0.0
Mexico  1997  82.3 85.5 4.5 4.9 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Peru  1993  7.1 24.2 39.3 11.4 37.1  37.7  0.0 10.2
Poland  1999  - 59.6 - - -  32.8 -  2.2
Uruguay  1996  55.5 57.9 39.6 36.9 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: HFSA, AIOS, FIAP  
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Source: Otermin (2004). 
26.       At the start of the reform, Hungary was expected to follow a mixed financing 
strategy that would result in some increase in national savings and open more room for 
investment in private instruments.  This would be achieved through parametric reforms to 
the PAYG system, and observance of the Maastricht ceiling of 3 percent of GDP on fiscal 
deficits during the whole period of reform implementation.
8 However, fiscal deficits 
increased significantly during the early 2000s, as shown in Table 10.  This increase in the 
fiscal deficit was due in good part to a sharp increase in public sector wages, and exceeded 
by a wide margin the revenue losses to the second pillar.  As shown in Table 10, between 
2000 and 2004, the annual losses to the second pillar increased by about 0.5 percent of 
GDP, while the primary balance worsened by 3 percent of GDP.  In the intermediate years 
the difference was much larger.  This increase in deficits led to an increase in the ratio of 
public debt to GDP above and beyond the increase that would result from a debt-financed 
transition with a neutral fiscal policy in other areas, and also contributed to the decline in 
national savings in the same period.  Under these conditions, a large share of Government 
bonds in pension fund portfolios is not a surprising outcome. 
Table 10: Fiscal Policy and National Savings in the Transition, 2000 – 2004 
  Unit  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
General Government Balance  % GDP  -2.8  -4.5  -9.4  -7.2  -5.4 
 Primary Balance  % GDP  2.1  -0.3  -5.6  -3.4  -1.2 
Losses to the Second Pillar  % GDP  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.1 
Government Debt  % GDP  55.4  53.5  57.1  59.1  60.7 
         
Gross National Savings 
1  %  GDP  22.3 20.6 18.1 16.6 15.3 
Gross Domestic Investment 
2  %  GDP  30.9 26.8 25.2 25.3 24.1 
Notes: 1) consistent with the external current account; 2) includes changes in inventories. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, HFSA, IMF 
                                                 
8 Rocha and Vittas (2002).  
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27.       In addition to fiscal policy, there are also other factors that may have contributed 
to the observed portfolio composition, particularly the high share of Government bonds.  
Firstly, alternative financial instruments have not been developed, with the exception of 
the very recent and promising development of the mortgage bond market.  The lack of 
development of financial instruments such as corporate bonds, infrastructure bonds and 
private equity has been due in part to the expansion of lending by a very competitive 
banking sector, after a period of contraction in the 1990s due to restructuring and 
privatization.  However, some residual regulatory obstacles may also have hindered the 
development of these markets, as discussed in Section VII. 
28.       Secondly, asset managers may have become wary of equity investments, as a 
result of the very poor performance of equity markets in the early years of the reform.  As 
shown in Figure 3, the second pillar started operating in 1998, the year when the 
Hungarian equity market (measured by the BUX index) was severely hit by the Russian 
crisis.  Equity prices recovered in 1999 but declined sharply again in 2000 and 2001, in 
line with the overall decline in international equity markets.  During this whole period 
bond returns (measured by the MAX index) were higher and less volatile.  The situation 
only reverted in 2003, when equity prices initiated a steady recovery, and bond prices 
faltered due to an increase in interest rates (Figure 4). 





















































































































































































Source: AKK and MNB data. 
29.       Thirdly, there is a prevalent view among market participants and regulators that 
pension fund portfolios in Hungary are conservative because most asset management 
companies are subsidiaries of mother companies in Continental Europe, i.e., from 
countries that do not have an “equity culture”.  According to this view, the presence of a 
larger number of subsidiaries of Anglo-Saxon companies in Poland would also explain the 
larger holdings of equity in the Polish second pillar, relatively to Hungary’s.  Finally, 
members of the few voluntary pension funds that provide portfolio choices have favored 
more conservative portfolios, made up almost exclusively of Government bonds (OECD 
2005).  Although the experience with multiple portfolios is very recent and limited (only 5  
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out of the 75 voluntary pension funds offer more than one portfolio), some asset managers 
may have extrapolated this revealed preference for conservative portfolios to the much 
wider universe of second pillar members. 
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30.       The average return performance of MPFs has been rather disappointing.  As shown 
in Table 11 and Table 12, the real rate of return net of fees was negative in some years and 
the annualized average net real rate return in the 1998 – 2005 period amounted to only 3.9 
percent p.a., lower than the average real wage growth of 5.3 percent in the same period.
9 
This last measure is a measure of the implicit return in a balanced PAYG system and 
commonly used as a benchmark for assessing the performance of a second pillar.  Wage 
growth in this period was unusually high and was in good part driven by a large increase 
in public sector wages.  For this reason, it may not be a good benchmark for measuring 
second pillar performance in Hungary during this period.  However, the average real rate 
of return in Hungary has also been low by comparison with other reforming countries, as 
shown in Table 13.
10 
Table 11: Net Rates of Return, Wage Growth, and Inflation Rates, 1998 – 2004 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 
1 
Net Nominal Rate of Return  15.7  17.1  7.9  8.0  7.4  3.4  16.3  13.0 
Wage  Growth  16.8 12.1 12.7 13.2 15.0 12.7  6.3  6.2 
Inflation  Rate  (Aver)  14.2  10.0 9.8 9.2 5.3 4.6 6.8  3.9 
Inflation  Rate  (Dec)  10.3  11.2  10.1 6.8 4.8 5.7 5.5  3.0 
Notes: /1 estimates 
Source: NBH and HFSA raw data (wage and return), and IMF (inflation). 
                                                 
9 We use December inflation to calculate the real rate of return and average inflation to calculate the real 
wage growth as the rate of return is realized in December of each year while wages are a flow over the year. 
10 Rates of return in Hungary are reported net of asset management fees, while in other countries rates of 
return are usually reported in gross terms.  The average gross rate of return shown in Table 12 and Table 13 
was estimated by adding asset management fees of 1 percent of assets.    
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Table 12:  Average Gross and Net Real Rates of Return and Wage Growth, 1998 – 2005 
Average Weighted Real  
Net Rate of  Return 
1 
Average Weighted Real  
Gross Rate of Return 
2 
Average Real Wage 
Growth 
3 
3.85% 4.85% 5.27% 
Notes: 1/ Difference between the Average Net Rate of Return (weighted by 2003 – 2004 average assets) in Table 14 and 
the Average Inflation Rate (Dec);  2/ 100 basis points spread have been assumed between the net and gross rates; 3/ 
Difference between the Average Wage Growth and the Average Inflation Rate (Aver). 
Source: NBH and HFSA raw data, IMF 
31.       The lower average rate return of Hungarian pension funds begs an explanation, as 
pension funds in other reforming countries also invested conservatively during this period.  
One possible explanation for the lower returns in Hungary is the lower risk premium of 
Hungarian Government securities that translated, ceteris paribus, into lower real interest 
rates on these securities.  As shown in Table 13, Hungarian sovereign issues had one of 
the best credit ratings and paid the lowest spreads among other reforming countries, with 
the possible exception of Chile.  For this reason, it is not surprising that real rates of 
interest on Government securities were one of the lowest among other reforming 
countries, and that pension fund returns were also relatively low.
11 Chilean funds would 
also have generated low returns if they had invested primarily in Government securities.  
Their higher returns were generated fundamentally by a much more diversified portfolio, 
consisting not only of domestic and international equity, but also of mortgage, corporate, 
and infrastructure bonds paying a premium over Government bonds. 
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Hungary 3.9  3.9  59  BBB+  A- 
Argentina 9.9  -  3,574  BB  SD 
Bolivia 10.4 7.7  -  B+  B- 
Chile 10.2  4.0  156  A-  A 
Colombia 6.9 11.6  1/ 579  BB  BB 
Costa Rica  6.7  -  327  BB  BB 
El Salvador  9.9  -  315  BB+  BB+ 
Mexico 7.7 4.2 299  BB+  BBB- 
Peru  7.6 - 531 -  - 
Poland 8.6  8.1  165  BBB+  BBB+ 
Uruguay 12.9  -  723 BBB-  B 
Notes: 1/ 2001-2004 arithmetic average of coupon of gross internal debt. 
Sources: HFSA, AIOS, World Bank, S&P, and IMF 
32.       In addition to the lower risk premium on Government securities, the return 
performance of MPFs was also affected by factors specific to Hungary, such as the drop in 
equity prices that resulted from the Russian crisis, and the steep increase in interest rates 
in recent years that produced a capital loss on the portfolio of fixed income assets.  The 
                                                 
11 Ex-post real interest rates were computed for only a sub-set of reforming countries due to data limitations.    
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recovery of bond and equity prices in 2004 and 2005 indicates that these were temporary 
factors and suggests that the average return performance should continue improving in 
coming years.  However, the improvement in performance will only be sustained in the 
longer-run if MPFs diversify further their portfolios, holding larger amounts of higher 
yield securities issued in Hungary, the EU, and in other markets. 
33.       Net rates of return have been generally similar across MPFs, reflecting their fairly 
similar portfolios.  This is due to herding and the fact that some asset management 
companies manage the assets of more than one MPF.  However, there are also some 
noteworthy differences.  As shown in Table 14, the average net rate of return of MPFs 
sponsored by employers and independent MPFs was slightly higher than the return of 
MPFs sponsored by financial institutions, and the standard deviations and coefficients of 
variation were smaller.  The larger standard deviation of the returns of MPFs sponsored by 
financial institutions reveals that some of these MPFs performed significantly below the 
average during the period.   
Table 14: Annual Net Rate of Return by Type of MPF, 1998 – 2004 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004  Av. 
Total MPF Market     
Average Rate of Return  15.7 17.1 7.9 8.0 7.4  3.4  16.3 10.8
Average Rate of Return (weighted)  13.2 17.4 6.6 6.8 6.7  3.6  17.0 10.2
Standard Deviation  3.9 2.6 2.7 2.0 1.9  1.5  1.9 2.4
Coefficient of Variation  0.30 0.15 0.42 0.29 0.29  0.41  0.11 0.28
Corr.  Coeff.  (Contribution fee)  -0.13 -0.52 -0.17 -0.21 -0.08  0.37  0.21 -0.08
Corr.  Coeff.  (AM fee)  -0.42 0.00 -0.27 -0.41 -0.51  -0.19  0.05 -0.25
Sponsored by Employers     
Average Rate of Return  16.4 16.3 8.7 9.0 8.0  3.0  16.2 11.1
Average Rate of Return (weighted)  17.0 16.2 8.8 9.0 8.0  3.1  16.3 11.2
Standard Deviation  2.0 1.7 1.7 1.1 1.8  2.2  2.3 1.8
Coefficient of Variation  0.12 0.10 0.19 0.12 0.23  0.71  0.14 0.23
Corr.  Coeff.  (Contribution fee)  -0.31 -0.64 -0.16 -0.29 0.16  -0.03  0.00 -0.18
Corr.  Coeff.  (AM fee)  0.79 0.07 -0.44 -0.56 0.20  0.35  0.65 0.15
Sponsored by Financial Institutions     
Average Rate of Return  14.8 17.5 8.0 7.6 6.8  3.2  16.1 10.6
Average Rate of Return (weighted)  12.6 17.4 6.6 6.6 6.6  3.5  17.1 10.0
Standard Deviation  5.3 3.4 2.8 2.4 2.0  1.1  2.0 2.7
Coefficient of Variation  0.42 0.20 0.42 0.36 0.31  0.32  0.12 0.31
Corr.  Coeff.  (Contribution fee)  -0.36 -0.52 0.04 -0.28 -0.27  0.74  0.47 -0.02
Corr.  Coeff.  (AM fee)  -0.43 -0.09 -0.43 -0.25 -0.52  -0.59  0.15 -0.31
Independent    
Average Rate of Return  16.9 17.4 6.1 7.5 8.3  4.5  16.9 11.1
Average Rate of Return (weighted)  17.2 18.0 4.8 7.0 7.4  4.7  16.4 10.8
Standard Deviation  1.9 1.0 4.2 1.0 1.7  0.5  0.8 1.6
Coefficient of Variation  0.11 0.06 0.86 0.15 0.23  0.10  0.05 0.22
Corr.  Coeff.  (Contribution fee)  -0.33 -0.39 -0.75 -0.71 -0.90  0.92  -0.97 -0.45
Corr.  Coeff.  (AM fee)  0.77 0.64 0.74 -0.87 -0.72  1.00  -0.97 0.09
Source: HFSA raw data 
34.       The MPFs sponsored by financial institutions charge on average higher asset 
management fees, as shown in the next section.  Moreover, there is a negative correlation 
between net rates of return and asset management fees, driven precisely by this group of  
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MPFs.  This implies that members of some of these MPFs have been paying higher asset 
management fees without benefiting from a commensurately better asset management 
performance.  The fact that these MPFs have been able to retain market share reflects the 
weak response of members to prices (i.e., returns and fees).  This inertia and the resulting 
market segmentation are due, at least to some extent, to weak disclosure rules.  This issue 
will be further examined in the sections below. 
V.   PERFORMANCE OF THE SECOND PILLAR: COSTS AND FEES 
35.       MPFs charge two main types of fees, an operational fee which is charged on 
contributions and an asset management fee which is charged on assets.  The operational 
fee covers the wages of the small staff of the MPFs and expenditures related to revenue 
collection, record keeping, and marketing.  These activities are usually outsourced to 
separate administration companies, but some MPFs sponsored by large employers and 
independent MPFs perform these functions internally.  The asset management fee is paid 
by the MPF to the independent asset management company and usually covers not only 
asset management but also brokerage and custodian fees. Very few MPFs perform asset 
management internally.  The asset management fee is usually defined as a fixed fraction 
of assets under management, but in a few cases it also includes a variable component 
linked to return performance.  In either case, the asset management fee is effectively 
charged to members, because their accounts are credited on a net basis.
12 
A.   Operating Fees 
36.       Hungarian accounting standards require MPFs to divide contributions into three 
separate reserves: (i) a “coverage” reserve for the individual accounts; (ii) an 
“operational” reserve to cover operational costs; and (iii) a “liquidity” reserve to smooth 
rates of return and to relax eventual liquidity constraints in paying benefits.  In 2004, 
MPFs allocated an average of 92.5 percent of contributions to the coverage reserve, 6.5 
percent to the operational reserve and 1 percent to the liquidity reserve. 
37.       Average operating fees increased from about 5.5 percent of contributions in the 
early years of operation to about 6.5 percent of contributions in 2004, as shown in Table 
15.  Independent MPFs and MPFs sponsored by large employers have charged higher 
operating fees than MPFs sponsored by financial institutions, possibly reflecting the fact 
that some functions are performed internally.  However, this is compensated by much 
lower asset management fees, as noted below. 
                                                 
12 Market participants indicate that performance fees are negligible.  An exit fee of no more that 0.1 percent 
of the balance can be charged by the MPF to members switching to other funds but this fee has also been 
negligible, since very few members have switched funds since the reform.    
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Table 15: Operating Fees (% charged on contributions), 1998 – 2004 
    1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 
Fund  Sponsor  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)  (%)  (%) 
Dimenzió  EMP  6.0 6.0 5.9 5.9 6.0  5.9  6.0 
HONVÉD  EMP  6.0 6.0 6.0 7.4 7.5  7.5  7.5 
Postás  EMP  5.8 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0  5.0  5.0 
Vasustas  EMP  8.0 7.1 6.3 7.0 7.0  7.0  6.9 
VIT  EMP  6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0  7.0  7.0 
AEGON  FIN  6.0 6.5 5.4 5.6 6.0  6.0  5.9 
AH  FIN  5.0 5.0 4.7 6.9 7.0  7.0  6.5 
Budapest  FIN  4.0 4.0 4.2 5.0 6.0  6.0  5.9 
CS  FIN  5.5 5.1 5.1 5.5 7.0  7.0  6.6 
ERSTE  FIN  5.4 5.5 6.7 5.8 6.0  6.6  6.9 
ING  FIN  5.6 6.2 6.0 6.8 7.0  7.0  7.0 
MKB  FIN  6.1 5.7 5.4 5.5 5.5  5.5  5.5 
OTP  FIN  5.1 5.0 5.9 6.9 7.0  7.0  6.5 
Quaestor  FIN  5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.0  7.4  7.0 
UNIQA FIN  -  10.0  4.2  5.3  5.5  5.3  5.5 
Aryankor  INDEP  5.6 5.2 4.9 6.4 7.0  7.0  6.8 
Életút  INDEP  4.7 6.2 5.9 6.0 6.0  6.0  6.0 
Évgyűrűk  INDEP  7.0 6.3 6.6 7.7 8.0  7.6  7.1 
Weighted  Average  MKT  5.6 5.7 5.5 6.4 6.8  6.8  6.5 
Weighted  Average  EMP  6.1 5.9 5.8 6.4 6.6  6.6  6.6 
Weighted  Average  FIN  5.5 5.6 5.5 6.4 6.7  6.7  6.5 
Weighted  Average  INDEP  6.3 6.0 6.0 7.2 7.5  7.3  6.9 
Source: HFSA raw data 
38.       Administration and record keeping account for the largest share of operational 
costs, as shown in Table 16.  This is followed by wages of MPF personnel, the 
supervisory fee paid to the HFSA, and the guarantee fee.  In contrast to most systems in 
Latin America, the share of marketing-related costs in total costs has been extremely 
small, although it is possible that some marketing activities are performed by other 
companies in the same financial group (i.e., the asset manager or the insurance company) 
and the associated costs are hidden in the asset management fee.  It is also possible that 
the costs associated with contribution collection are not fully reflected in administration 
costs, because they are partly shifted to employers.  In Hungary, arrangements for 
collecting contributions are not efficient and employers can be required to submit 
contributions to up to 18 different funds and spend substantial resources in this activity.  
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Table 16: Operational Costs of MPFs (%), 2001 – 2004 
 2001  2002  2003  2004 
Material expenses  0.9  0.6  0.6  0.4 
Wages and social security contributions  6.8  8.2  7.9  8.0 
Compensations for pension fund officers  1.7  1.4  1.4  1.4 
Agent fees related to member recruitment  5.0  3.7  3.5  2.0 
Administration and record keeping fees  54.5  61.0  60.3  65.5 
Audit fees  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.3 
Actuarial fees  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.4 
Consulting fees  0.3  0.9  0.5  0.4 
Marketing expenses  0.5  1.4  2.0  2.1 
Supervision fees  5.1  8.0  8.6  4.7 
Guarantee fees  5.9  5.7  6.1  6.4 
Other 18.1  7.9  8.2  8.3 
TOTAL (HUF millions)  6,763.8  7,141.3  9,352.5  12,651.5 
% of contributions (weighted average)  N.A.  6.8  6.8  6.5 
Source: HFSA  
B.   Asset Management Fees 
39.       As mentioned before, asset management fees are typically expressed as a share of 
total assets managed, although some asset management companies also charge a 
performance fee that depends on the rate of return.  The asset management fee usually 
covers brokerage and custodian fees as well.  As shown in Table 17, average asset 
management fees have declined slightly since the start of the system and have been 
around 100 basis points or 1 percent of total assets managed.  Asset management fees 
have been very different across the different types of funds, with MPFs sponsored by 
financial institutions typically paying much higher fees than the other two types of MPFs.  
The MPFs sponsored by employers have paid the lowest fees, and it is noteworthy that 
some asset management companies change much lower fees to these MPFs than to MPFs 
within the same financial group.
13 
                                                 
13 For instance, in 2004, the AEGON asset management company charged a management fee of 1.3 percent 
to the AEGON pension fund and a fee of 0.3 percent to the Dimenzió pension fund.  
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Table 17: Asset Management Fees (% charged on average assets), 1998 – 2004 
    1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 
Fund  Sponsor  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)  (%)  (%) 
Dimenzió  EMP  0.00 0.93 0.71 0.37 0.27  0.29  0.30 
HONVÉD  EMP  0.11 0.70 0.56 0.54 0.49  0.24  0.34 
Postás  EMP  0.09 0.52 0.33 0.37 0.36  0.33  0.33 
Vasustas  EMP  0.03 0.95 0.40 0.35 0.22  0.17  0.25 
VIT  EMP  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.05 
AEGON  FIN  2.25 2.93 1.68 1.68 1.36  1.43  1.37 
AH  FIN  0.93 0.99 1.41 0.91 1.18  0.78  1.19 
Budapest  FIN  1.15 1.34 1.21 1.16 1.17  1.02  1.00 
CS  FIN  0.79 0.96 1.09 1.08 0.97  1.28  1.06 
ERSTE  FIN  0.17 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.98  1.41  1.44 
ING  FIN  1.03 0.90 0.94 0.82 0.90  0.86  0.98 
MKB  FIN  0.00 0.00 0.68 0.53 0.53  0.65  0.64 
OTP  FIN  1.12 1.50 0.78 0.94 0.71  0.79  0.87 
Quaestor  FIN  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01  0.01  0.09 
UNIQA  FIN  -  0.80 1.90 1.86 1.83  1.34  1.21 
Aryankor  INDEP  0.34 0.59 0.62 1.05 1.19  0.58  0.57 
Életút  INDEP  0.00 0.53 0.74 0.25 0.20  0.21  0.29 
Évgyűrűk  INDEP  0.16 1.15 0.58 0.65 0.54  0.57  0.50 
Weighted  Average  MKT  1.13 1.42 1.06 1.03 0.95  0.92  0.97 
Weighted  Average  EMP  0.05 0.62 0.44 0.37 0.32  0.23  0.28 
Weighted  Average  FIN  1.29 1.51 1.14 1.09 1.00  1.00  1.05 
Weighted  Average  INDEP  0.21 0.94 0.60 0.81 0.84  0.57  0.53 
Source: HFSA raw data 
40.       This segmentation in asset management fees can be ascribed to the governance 
structure of MPFs and weak transparency provisions in the regulation of the second pillar.  
As previously mentioned, MPF boards are de facto controlled by their sponsors, which 
define the fees that will be charged by the service providers within the group.  Members 
do not de facto vote with their voices, as they typically do not go to general assemblies 
and vote for the boards, but could “vote with their feet”, i.e., switch to the funds 
generating higher rates of return and charging lower fees.  However, the lack of 
information on critical data on rates of returns and fees have limited competition and 
promoted the segmentation previously discussed.  The potential advantages of a hybrid 
pension system that includes low cost institutions have not been effectively explored. 
41.       The lack of transparency in the Hungarian second pillar has been due not only to 
the insufficient disclosure of returns and fees but also to the mixed fee structure that 
creates problems of comparability (i.e., operating fees charged on contributions and asset 
management fees charged on assets).  In 2004, MPFs were required for the first time to 
publish net and gross rates of return, but operational fees and asset management fees are 
still disclosed as a function of two different numerators.  This does not facilitate 
comparability of fees across funds for the average consumer.  
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C.   Total Fees 
42.       Table 18 and Table 19 show total fees expressed as a share of contributions and 
assets, respectively, for each MPF over the 1998-2004 period.  Average total fees as a 
share of contributions increased from 6 percent to about 10 percent in recent years, as 
shown in Table 19.  This increase in total fees on contributions reflects primarily the 
increasing fees associated with asset management, and which results fundamentally from 
a fixed asset management fee per unit of assets and larger assets.  Total fees charged by 
independent MPFs and MPFs sponsored by employers are on average significantly lower 
than the fees charged by MPFs sponsored by financial institutions, reflecting 
fundamentally their lower asset management fees.  The differences in total fees over 
contributions charged by individual MPFs have increased over time, and in 2004 
amounted frequently to 4 percent.  Members comparing simply the operating fees (Table 
15) would not be able to appreciate the differences across MPFs. 
Table 18: Total Fees as a Share of Contributions (%), 1998 – 2004 
    1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 
Fund  Sponsor  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)  (%)  (%) 
Dimenzió  EMP  6.0 7.2 7.3 7.0 7.0  7.0  7.1 
HONVÉD  EMP  6.1 6.6 6.8 8.5 8.8  8.2  8.7 
Postás  EMP  5.9 5.5 5.6 6.0 6.2  6.2  6.3 
Vasustas  EMP  8.0 8.0 6.8 7.8 7.7  7.6  7.8 
VIT  EMP  6.0 6.0 6.1 6.0 7.0  7.0  7.1 
AEGON  FIN  7.0 9.9 8.4 9.5 10.6  10.8  10.8 
AH  FIN  5.4 6.0 6.8 8.9 10.6 9.4 10.5 
Budapest  FIN  4.6 5.5 6.2 7.8 9.7  8.8  9.2 
CS  FIN  5.9 6.0 7.0 8.2 10.1  11.0  10.4 
ERSTE  FIN  5.4 6.1 7.9 7.5 8.7 10.6  10.9 
ING  FIN  6.0 7.1 7.6 8.7 9.7  9.6 10.4 
MKB  FIN  6.1 5.7 6.4 6.9 7.4  7.5  7.8 
OTP  FIN  5.7 6.4 7.0 8.9 8.9  9.3  9.3 
Quaestor  FIN  5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0  7.4  7.2 
UNIQA FIN  -  11.6  6.5  8.7  10.6  8.9  9.4 
Aryankor  INDEP  5.8 5.8 5.8 9.1 10.7 8.7  8.6 
Életút  INDEP  4.7 6.8 7.4 6.7 6.7  6.8  7.1 
Évgyűrűk  INDEP  7.1 7.2 7.5 9.1 9.6  9.3  8.8 
Weighted  Average  MKT  6.1 7.1 7.2 8.8 9.7  9.6  9.8 
Weighted  Average  EMP  6.1 6.5 6.5 7.3 7.6  7.3  7.6 
Weighted  Average  FIN  6.1 7.2 7.3 8.8 9.7  9.7 10.0 
Weighted  Average  INDEP  6.0 6.7 7.0 8.4 9.1  8.4  8.2 
Source: HFSA raw data 
43.       Average total fees expressed as a share of assets have decreased significantly, from 
13 percent in 1998 to 3 percent in 2004.  This sharp decrease is typical of young pension 
systems and reflects the rapid growth of assets relative to contributions.  Again, total fees 
expressed as a share of assets were lower for the MPFs sponsored by employers (2.1 
percent), followed by independent MPFs (2.6 percent) and MPFs sponsored by financial  
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groups (2.9 percent).  The relative differences in fees charged by different types of MPFs 
have increased over time, reflecting the increasing weight of the asset management fee. 
Table 19: Total Fees as a Share of Average Assets (%), 1998 – 2004 
    1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Fund  Sponsor  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Dimenzió  EMP  12.5  5.8 3.6 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.0 
HONVÉD  EMP  11.8  7.3 4.8 4.2 3.4 2.9 2.6 
Postás  EMP  12.7  5.3 3.2 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.6 
Vasustas  EMP  17.7  8.6 4.8 3.4 2.5 2.2 2.1 
VIT  EMP  11.4  4.9 2.9 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.0 
AEGON  FIN  15.7  8.4 4.8 4.1 3.1 3.2 3.0 
AH  FIN  11.5  6.1 4.6 3.9 3.5 3.0 3.1 
Budapest  FIN 9.3 5.0 3.7 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.8 
CS  FIN  11.4  6.0 4.0 3.3 3.1 3.5 2.9 
ERSTE  FIN  11.0  6.4 4.4 3.3 3.1 3.8 3.9 
ING  FIN  13.6  6.9 4.4 3.7 3.2 3.1 2.9 
MKB  FIN  12.4  5.3 4.0 2.6 2.0 2.5 2.2 
OTP  FIN  11.1  7.0 4.9 4.2 3.2 3.3 2.9 
Quaestor  FIN  10.2  4.5 4.2 3.1 2.5 3.5 3.5 
UNIQA  FIN    5.9 5.4 4.8 3.8 3.3 2.9 
Aryankor  INDEP  11.0  5.8 3.8 3.6 3.4 2.9 2.7 
Életút  INDEP  9.0 5.7 3.7 2.4 1.8 1.9 1.8 
Évgyűrűk  INDEP  11.3  8.7 5.1 4.3 3.3 3.1 2.6 
Weighted  Average  MKT  12.7  7.0 4.5 3.8 3.2 3.1 2.9 
Weighted  Average  EMP  12.5  6.1 3.8 3.0 2.4 2.3 2.1 
Weighted  Average FIN  12.9  7.0 4.6 3.9 3.2 3.2 2.9 
Weighted  Average  INDEP  11.1  7.6 4.6 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.6 
Source: HFSA raw data 
44.       Total fees in the Hungarian second pillar still compare favorably with most other 
systems with the same period of implementation, especially when expressed as a share of 
contributions.  As shown in Figure 5, the ratio of total fees to contributions has increased 
but is still one of the lowest, with the exception of Bolivia.
14 The ratio of total fees to 
assets is roughly equal to the average of other reforming countries, as shown in Figure 6.  
The difference between the two results reflects the mixed fee structure in Hungary, the 
low volume of assets, and the increasing dominance of the asset management fee.  Fees in 
most other countries are defined as a share of contributions, and this ratio does not change 
dramatically over time.  This implies a sharp decline in fees expressed as a share of assets 
over time.  By contrast, the current mixed fee structure in Hungary implies rising fees as a 
share of contributions, and a ratio of fee to assets that may not decline as much as the 
other countries in the long-run. 
                                                 
14 The comparison between Hungary and other Latin America countries should be controlled for differences 
in factors like coverage, contribution rates, and structure of the labor market.  
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Note: Contributions and costs are net of death and disability insurance for Latin American countries 
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45.       If operating and asset management fees are kept at their current levels of 6.5 
percent of contributions and 1 percent of assets, total fees in Hungary would compare 
unfavorably with other reforming countries in the long-run.  As shown in Figure 7, total 
fees over contributions would increase to more than 35 percent in 30 years, driven 
primarily by the fixed asset management fee of 1 percent charged on the increasing assets.  
Total fees over assets would converge to about 1.2 percent, as shown in Figure 8, an 
excessive level for a mandatory system.  Total fees over assets would not be much higher 
than the levels of fees in Chile today, but this comparison does not provide too much  
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comfort, as the persistence of high fees has been one of the main criticisms of the Chilean 
system.  These are the levels of fees charged by expensive active/high turnover equity 
mutual funds in the US.  The fees charged by indexed (passive) equity mutual funds, bond 
funds, and money market mutual funds are much lower than 1 percent of assets, and so are 
the fees charged by occupational pension funds in most countries.
15  
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Note: real wage growth = 4%, rate of return = 8%, asset management fees = 0.97% of assets and operating fees: 6.49 % 
of contributions. 
Source: Own calculations on HFSA data. 
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Note: Real wage growth = 4%, rate of return = 8%, asset management fees = 0.97% of assets, and operating fees = 
6.49% of contributions. 
Source: Own calculations on HFSA data. 
                                                 
15 See Colins (2003), Investment Company Institute (2003), and Rocha (2006).  
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46.       The exercise is admittedly mechanistic, and it is possible that both operating fees 
and asset management fees would be reduced over time, in line with asset growth.  
However, the exercise also illustrates the potential problems that may be caused by the 
maintenance of the mixed fee structure, combined with the lack of transparency and 
competition in the pension system.  If the system remains as segmented as it is in the 
present time, some members might be penalized and suffer from relatively low 
replacement ratios at the time of retirement. 
47.       Figure 9 and Figure 10 replicate the exercise for the two MPFs with the highest and 
lowest total fees over assets or over contributions in 2004 reported in Table 18 and Table 
19.  Results are also compared with and the results obtained before for the average MPF.  
Notice that total fees over contributions would converge to 51% and 16% for the highest 
and lowest cost MPFs, respectively.  Similarly, total fees over average assets would 
converge to 1.66% and 0.49% for the highest and lowest fee MPFs, respectively.  The 
exercise suggests that it should be possible to reduce long-run fees to about 50 basis 
points, which is also the level of fees charged by large occupational funds in the US.
16  
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Note: real wage growth = 4%, rate of return = 8%. 
Source: Own calculations on HFSA data. 
                                                 
16 Colins (ibid) and Investment Company Institute (ibid).  
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Note: Real wage growth = 4%, rate of return = 8%. 
Source: Own calculations on HFSA data. 
48.       An alternative way to examine fees in Hungary entails the examination of the 
long-run equivalence of fees over contributions and assets, building on the general 
methodology developed in Diamond (2001).  Figure 11 shows the compensating variation 
in fees of contributions that would be required to maintain the final balance constant if the 
fees on assets is set to 1 percent for an individual with a wage growth of 5%, a working 
career of 40 years (T = 40), and no interruption in service (T
* = 40).  It shows that fees on 
assets of 1 percent are equivalent to fees of 15 to 30 percent on contributions, depending 
on the net rate of return (gross rate minus fees).  These results are consistent with the 
simulations shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, and illustrate the long-run impact of asset 
fees charged during the whole accumulation phase.  In particular, the long-run total fee 
over assets of 1.18 percent for the average MPF would translate in a long run contribution 
fee of 17 – 35 percent.
17 
                                                 
17 The methodology is developed in Appendix B.  Note that the projected fees on contributions in Figure 7 
are higher because the average fees on assets charged during the accumulation phase are higher than 1 
percent and wage growth assumption is lower.    
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Note: The Y axis measures the long run fee over contribution required to compensate (hence, the negative 
sign) a 1% asset management fee for increasing asset net rate of return measured along the X axis.  Other 
assumptions used: wage growth = 5%, T = 40, T
* = 40. 
49.       Finally, the long-run impact of fees charged during the accumulation period can 
also be assessed through the computation of charge ratios.
18 A charge ratio is defined as 
one minus the accumulation ratio.  The accumulation ratio is the ratio of the final cash 
balance produced when fees are charged over the cash balance where fees are not charged.  
Table 20 reports the charge ratios for the average MPF in Hungary defined as the MPF 
that charges an operating fee of 6.49 percent of contributions and an asset management fee 
of 0.97 percent of assets.  The ratio is calculated for different wage growth rates, rates of 
return, interruption in service (T – T*) assumptions, and for a 40 year career individual 
(T = 40). 
Table 20: Charge ratios for the average MPF in Hungary, (%) 
      Rate of return (% p.a.) 
     2  5  8 
 2  26.9 25.3 23.8 




(% p.a.)  8  29.8 28.4 26.9 
 2  25.2 23.0 20.9 




(% p.a.)  8  29.2 27.3 25.2 
 2  23.5 20.5 17.7 




(% p.a.)  8  28.6 26.3 23.5 
Note: Contribution fee = 6.49%, asset management fee 0.97%, T = 40 
50.       Note that the charge ratio increases with non-contributory periods (due to 
unemployment, for instance), as even if the contribution fee is not charged, the asset 
                                                 
18 See Diamond (2000), Haukur, Trygvi, and Orszag (1999), Murthi, Orszag, and Orszag (2001 and 2001b), 
Rusconi (2004), and Whitehouse (2000).  
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management fee is charged until retirement.  There is a trade off between the rate of return 
and wage growth, as shown by the terms along the diagonals.  Note also that the charge 
ratio increases with the rate of return and decreases with wage growth.  When the rate of 
return increases the incidence of the asset management fee also increases, raising the 
charge ratio.  When wage growth increases, the end of period cash balance without fees 
increases more quickly than in the case of no fees, lowering the charge ratio. 
51.       Mitchell and Bateman (2003) report charge ratios for Australia that vary from 5 to 
15 percent for employer-sponsored defined contribution schemes, and that vary from 22 to 
28 percent for the much more costly open, retail schemes.  Whitehouse (2000) reports 
charge ratios that vary between 15 and 20 percent in most Latin American countries, but 
that can reach 28 and 35 percent in Argentina and Mexico, respectively.  Therefore, the 
charge ratios for the average MPF in Hungary do not compare favorably with the ratios of 
most other second pillars.   
52.       Again, the exercise is admittedly mechanistic but it illustrates the problems that 
may arise if the current structure and levels of fees are maintained in the longer-run: even 
a mere total fee of 1 percent over assets would consume the equivalent of 15 to 30 percent 
of the final cash balance over a full career of contributions and average assumptions on 
inflation, wage growth and rate of return.   
VI.   PENSION REFORM AND CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
53.       Pension reforms involving the introduction of a second pillar are expected to 
contribute to capital market development by promoting the growth of institutions with a 
long investment horizon, such as pension funds and insurance companies.  The presence 
of these institutions is expected, inter alia, to accelerate the development of several 
financial instruments with long maturities, improve access to finance and risk 
management to a wider range of investors, enhance competition in the financial sector, 
and promote better regulations and corporate governance. 
54.       The contribution of the second pillar to capital market development has been 
modest so far.  As shown in Table 21, there has been some progress in expanding the 
market for traded government securities and starting a market for mortgage bonds, and 
institutional investors have made a contribution to these positive developments.  However, 
indicators of liquidity and maturity suggest that the development of the market for 
government debt has been only moderate, and the stock of mortgage bonds is still very 
small.  Moreover, other financial instruments such as corporate, municipal, and 
infrastructure bonds have not been developed, nor has private equity. 
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2000 30.0  21.0  0.0  0.0 n.a.  0.0 
2004 43.0  26.0  6.0  0.1 n.a.  0.0 
Source: HFSA, BSE, MNB, AKK  
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55.       The government debt market remains the centerpiece of Hungary’s capital market 
and developed further during this period, as indicated by the increase in the share of 
traded securities from 53 to 74 percent of the total debt stock, and the corresponding 
increase in the stock of traded government securities from 30 to 43 percent of GDP 
between 2000 and 2004.  Moreover, 15-year bonds have been introduced and all auctions 
for these bonds have been oversubscribed, revealing a strong demand for these 
instruments, while the share of short-term T-bills has declined from 35 to 24 percent 
between 2000 and 2004.  Institutional investors contributed to these positive outcomes by 
holding an increasing share of the stock (Figure 12) and participating actively in the 
auctions of long-term securities.   
56.       At the same time, the issues of long-term securities are still a small share of total 
issues, as shown in Figure 13.  As a result, the increase in the average maturity and 
duration of the stock has been modest, as shown in Figure 14.  Moreover, the annual 
turnover of all government securities has dropped from 6-8 times the debt stock in 2000 to 
3- 4 times the stock in 2004, and bid-ask spreads have increased in the same period.  
Therefore, whereas there has been progress in developing the market for government 
securities, this progress should not be exaggerated either. 
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57.       The short average maturity of the stock of government debt looks particularly 
disappointing, because the lengthening of the maturity of government debt is one of the 
first outcomes expected from a pension reform.  A more pronounced increase in maturity 
and duration would indicate that the Government is succeeding in developing this key 
market and building a yield curve for government securities, which provides the 
benchmark and the necessary preconditions for the development of other fixed income 
instruments with long durations such as mortgage, corporate, and infrastructure bonds.   
58.       The short duration of Government debt may not reflect a failure of the pension 
reform, however, but a deliberate strategic decision by the Debt Management Agency  
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(AKK), designed to avoid losses at the time of accession to the Euro zone, which is 
anticipated for 2010.  Duration is apparently being maintained at 2.2 years to reduce the 
risk of losses from converting long-term liabilities denominated in HUFs into Euros at 
interest rates which are higher than those in the Euro zone.
19 It would not make sense to 
lock in these higher interest rates for Euro-denominated contracts.  Therefore, the short 
duration probably reflects a sound debt management decision, but it remains true that the 
short duration of instruments in this key market will tend to slow the development of other 
related fixed income instruments.   
59.       Regarding the development of the equity market, BSE market capitalization has 
remained roughly stable at relatively low levels.  Moreover, as with many other regional 
exchanges, capitalization and trading are dominated by a small number of large national 
companies.  The BSE is highly concentrated, with the top five companies accounting for 
89 percent of market capitalization and 93 percent of turnover in 2004.  A variety of fixed 
income instruments are also listed on the BSE, but trading in those instruments (chiefly 
government bonds) is primarily conducted in OTC markets.  Institutional investors have 
contributed modestly to the development of Hungary’s equity market, as indicated by their 
limited holdings of domestic equity, concentrated in very few issues. 
60.       The development of Hungary’s equity market is being dominated by global trends 
towards equity migration.  These trends are driving the recent acquisition of the BSE by a 
group of Austrian and Hungarian banks and financial institutions, including the Vienna 
Stock Exchange, and the merger of the BSE and Budapest Commodities Exchange (BCE).  
This group is now seeking a closer relationship with equity market players in Poland, as 
part of a regional strategy to integrate the stock market, the commodity market, and 
settlement and custody provision into one value chain.  It is not clear what will be the role 
of the BSE as Hungary integrates more closely with the EU.  On the one hand, it may 
continue to play a role as a provider of finance to second tier, medium-sized companies, 
but it could also become increasingly redundant in an integrated regional financial system. 
61.       The market for corporate bonds has not developed because of intense bank 
competition for prime borrowers and a high degree of foreign ownership, which facilitates 
access to loans from the foreign mother company.  However, there may also be some 
regulatory glitches.  While bank loans can be arranged in a few days with established 
creditors, the costs of preparing a new bond prospectus and the time required to obtain the 
necessary approvals can be significant.  Moreover, if liabilities are greater than equity 
companies need to obtain a credit rating before issuing a bond.  This creates a serious 
problem for potential issuers, because no credit rating agencies are active in Hungary and 
many of the largest blue-chip companies are not formally rated. 
62.       Developing a private equity industry has been a challenge in many countries, and 
in the case of Hungary inflexible regulations have aggravated this problem.  The Venture 
Capital Act places requirements on fund investors to pay in capital before investments 
have been identified and limits the flexibility of fund managers regarding the timing of 
their investments and design of investment structures.  Because of these restrictions, the 
                                                 
19 Real interest rates on Government securities are lower in Hungary than in most other emerging countries, 
in good part because of Hungary’s higher credit rating.  However, Hungarian rates are still higher than rates 
on Government securities issued by developed countries in the Euro zone.  
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private equity industry incorporates and maintains their capital outside of Hungary even 
though in many cases their operations are based in Budapest. 
63.       Infrastructure bonds have not developed either, partly due to market limitations 
and partly to some regulatory barriers to Public-Private Partnership (PPP).  Several large 
highway projects are being considered as PPPs, but these will probably need to access 
external markets due to their large size.  Smaller PPP projects would have the potential to 
be matched with domestic institutional investor capacity, and could include hospitals, 
housing, and sporting complexes.  However, bond financing for smaller PPP projects is 
hindered by the lack of clear project frameworks, including clear ownership structures, 
methods for handling revenue, and risk mitigation.  There are also some regulations that 
make it difficult for a newly formed PPP company to issue bonds, such as a clause in the 
Capital Market Act prohibiting newly formed companies from issuing bonds if they have 
been in operation for less than one year, unless guaranteed by the government or if the 
bond issue is backed by specific assets pledged as collateral.  Special purpose companies 
set up for PPPs are generally new and raise money backed by contracts for revenue from 
assets under construction, so would not satisfy those requirements. 
VII.   REGULATION OF THE ACCUMULATION AND PAYOUT PHASES 
64.       This section analyses the regulatory framework of MPFs of the accumulation and 
payout phases.  The main areas analyzed are: licensing, governance, investment 
regulation, accounting standards and valuation rules, auditing standards, disclosure rules,  
A.   Main Regulatory Issues in the Accumulation Phase 
Licensing 
65.       Licensing criteria and procedures in Hungary are generally reasonable.  The list of 
documents needed to obtain a license includes the deed of foundation, the financial plan of 
the fund, information on the members of the board of directors, the supervisory board and 
the auditor, internal controls and auditing systems, and outsourcing contracts with any 
service provider, including custodians and external asset managers.   
66.       The HFSA screens applications to ensure that MPFs are managed by reputable and 
qualified individuals and that it only employs reputable service providers.  For instance, 
while in principle most functions can be outsourced, each MPF needs to have on payroll at 
least a managing director, a senior accounting officer, a manager responsible for 
investments and an internal controller.  These professionals are subject to adequate fit and 
proper tests.  However, the same sound procedures are not applied to board members.  
The Law requires only a higher education degree for the chairmen of the board of 
directors and the supervisory board, and imposes no requirements on other board 
members.  The simple requirement of a higher degree does not ensure the qualifications, 
reputation and professional experience, needed to effectively govern a pension fund.   
Governance 
67.       MPFs are legally structured as non-profit, open mutual benefit associations, 
following exactly the same legal structure of voluntary third pillar funds, which have 
existed since 1993.  The governance structure of MPFs is also equal to the structure of  
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voluntary funds.  The maximum governing body of an MPF is the general assembly of the 
fund members.  In large pension funds the delegates, elected to such position for a period 
of five years, are expected to represent members.  The general assembly meets typically 
twice a year, to discuss and approve the annual report and the financial plan.  It also 
approves modifications to the deed of foundation and fund regulations, elects and removes 
the members of the board of directors and the supervisory board, and elects and removes 
the external auditor.  The general assembly does not approve the choice of external service 
providers like asset managers. 
68.       The board of directors is the managing body of the fund and is formed only by 
members of the fund.  The powers and responsibilities of the board of directors include 
implementing the resolutions passed at the general meeting, ensuring that the fund’s books 
are kept in accordance with regulatory requirements and the fund’s by-laws, approving the 
fund’s investment policy and the method of asset valuation, selecting the asset manager, 
and selecting other external service providers such as administrators. 
69.       The supervisory board is composed by a majority of fund members and regularly 
reviews and inspects the MPF’s finances, accounting and management.  The supervisory 
board also recommends the external auditor to the general assembly for approval, selected 
on the basis of an open and competitive application process.
20 
70.       While in principle the governance structure is designed to grant decision powers to 
fund members, this outcome does not materialize in many funds.  The open mutual 
association nature and the absence of capital requirements imply that in most cases the 
MPF needs a sponsor to meet the start-up costs.  As shown in Section II, the industry is 
divided in three groups of MPFs: (i) MPFs sponsored by financial institutions; (ii) MPFs 
sponsored by large employers; and (iii) independent MPFs (in other words, MPFs without 
a sponsor).  The third group consists of only three MPFs and accounts for less than 10 
percent of the second pillar. 
71.       The boards of MPFs sponsored by financial institutions are de facto controlled by 
these institutions.  Typically, the general assembly is dominated by the employees of these 
financial institutions, and vote on members of the board of directors and the supervisory 
board among pre-selected employees.  The board of directors then outsources asset 
management and administration to the asset management and administration companies 
within the sponsoring financial group.  Therefore, these MPFs tend to operate in practice 
like open pension funds in Chile and most other countries that followed the Chilean 
approach, in the sense that there is a one to one relationship between the pension fund and 
the profit-oriented asset manager and administrator within the financial group.  A major 
difference with Chile, however, is the lack of transparency of this relationship and the 
weaker legal accountability of the sponsoring financial institution (evidenced, among 
other factors, by the lack of capital requirements on the fund manager).   
                                                 
20 This two-board structure is relatively common in Continental Europe, although it was originally designed 
for joint-stock companies, not mutual associations.  In Company Laws (or Commercial Codes) the 
supervisory board is expected to represent the interests of shareholders and neutralize any influence of 
management on the main board.  It plays a role similar to that of independent, outside directors in the one 
board systems prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries.  
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72.       The MPFs sponsored by large employers tend to operate in practice like non-
profit, occupational, defined contribution pension funds in high income OECD countries 
(such as Australia).  There are some differences regarding the rules for board composition, 
and in the fact that these funds are typically closed, while the Hungarian employer-based 
funds are open to members without an employment relationship with the sponsor.  
However, the absence of a profit motive by the sponsor provides a similarity to 
occupational funds in the OECD.  Independent MPFs are not related to any particular 
sponsor and operate like non-profit mutuals, following more closely the original design 
intended for third pillar funds.   
73.       Not surprisingly, the fees charged by MPFs sponsored by financial institutions are 
higher than the fees charged by the other two types of MPFs, as shown in Section V.  
Since all funds are open, members of high cost funds can switch to lower cost funds, i.e., 
“vote with their feet”, but very little switching has taken place since 1998.  This inertia is 
due, at least to some extent, to weak disclosure requirements.  The absence of readily 
available information on comparable fees makes it more difficult for members to realize 
that they could switch to lower cost funds yielding similar returns.  The allocation of 
undecided new entrants to default funds which tend to be the higher cost funds may also 
explain the result.  Finally, funds sponsored by financial institutions have a sales force and 
probably adopt more active marketing tactics than other types of funds. 
74.       It is important to note that the Hungarian construction may lead to situations where 
the boards may not act in the best interests of their members, especially in the case of the 
funds sponsored by financial institutions.  For example, the supervisory board 
recommends an auditor to the general assembly on the basis of an open and competitive 
bidding process.  If the board of directors followed a similar procedure for the selection of 
the asset manager and the administrator, it is possible that companies outside the 
sponsoring financial group would be selected.  This would create an unusual and tense 
situation, because the employees of the sponsoring institutions (who are the board 
members) would be handing the pension business to a competitor.   
75.       One of the main questions faced by Hungarian regulators is whether the current 
market segmentation can be addressed by simply improving disclosure rules, marketing 
rules, consumer education, and the rules for allocation of new entrants, or whether more 
forceful measures are called for, changing the core incentives and decisions at the 
management and board levels.  If stronger measures prove necessary to reduce fees and 
market segmentation, a related question is whether this could be achieved by simply 
enforcing the formal fiduciary obligations of boards, or whether other more structural 
legal changes would be necessary, such as the “demutualization” of pension funds (i.e., 
adopting the more typical Chilean-style legal structure), or the adoption of different 
institutional arrangements for the second pillar.  It is likely that a gradual approach 
involving initially only the adoption of measures to improve transparency, performance 
comparability and promote migration to low cost funds would improve competition and 
reduce the current segmentation.  These measures could be strengthened by the 
introduction of more concrete behavioral controls
21 for current directors or by requiring 
                                                 
21 See Hess and Impavido (2004) and Impavido (2005) for a discussion on governance mechanisms that 
pension funds can adopt to compensate for the weaknesses of representative governing bodies.  See Clark  
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independent directors to serve on the MPF boards in order to facilitate the enforcement of 
the fiduciary obligations of boards. 
Investment Regulation 
76.       Hungary adopted initially an investment regime for the second pillar based on 
portfolio restrictions, as opposed to the prudent man rule adopted typically in Anglo-
Saxon countries.  However, the investment regime has not been overly restrictive and has 
been progressively relaxed over time.  As shown in Table 22, the limits on instruments or 
asset classes are reasonable, and have been either relaxed or eliminated over time.   
77.       The initial restrictions on foreign assets have been relaxed and eliminated for 
EU/OECD countries.  There is a restriction of 30 percent on foreign currency exposure, 
equal to that prevailing in most Western European countries before the adoption of the 
Euro.  The previous 50 percent limit on equity holdings was eliminated for listed equity in 
January 2005.  The strict limit on direct real estate holdings is justified for defined 
contribution funds that need to value portfolios on a mark-to-market basis and therefore 
need more liquid portfolios than defined benefit funds.  The limits by individual issuers 
are reasonable and also exist in many countries, including countries that follow the 
prudent man rule.  The rule that limits the use of derivatives for hedging purposes is 
appropriate.  The limits that seem restrictive include the limits on mortgage-backed 
securities and private equity.   
                                                                                                                                                    
(2005) for a critique of governance systems that rely exclusively on behavioral controls without 
emphasizing the need for experience qualification and professionalism of trustees.  
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Table 22: Statutory limits on asset holdings for MPFs. 
Cat. Instrument  % 
A  Cash (Hungarian and foreign currencies)    
B  Transaction account and investment account    
C Term  deposits    
D Debt  securities  (bonds)    
d1  Hungarian government securities    
d2  Securities backed by the absolute guarantee of the Hungarian state    
d3  Foreign government securities    
d4  Securities backed by the absolute guarantee of a foreign state    
d5  Publicly traded bonds issued by a business organization registered in Hungary, excluding credit institutions 
1 10% 
d6  Publicly traded bonds issued by a business organization registered abroad, excluding credit institutions 
1 10% 
d7  Publicly traded bonds issued by a credit institution registered in Hungary    
d8  Publicly traded bonds issued by a credit institution registered abroad    
d9  Publicly traded bonds issued by a Hungarian municipality 
1 10% 
d10  Publicly traded bonds issued by a foreign municipality 
1 10% 
E Stocks   
e1  Stocks listed on the BSE or another recognized securities market and offered to the public in Hungary    
e2 
Stocks issued and offered to the public in Hungary, which the issuer has pledged to list on a stock exchange or a 
recognized securities market within six months, and there is no statutory or other impediment to listing, or stocks for 
which at least two brokerage firms publicly quote a price representing an irrevocable purchase obligation continuously 
within 30 days prior to the purchase 
1 
10% 
e3  Stocks listed on a stock exchange or another recognized securities market and issued 
and offered to the public abroad    
e4 
Stocks issued and offered to the public abroad, which the issuer has pledged to list on a stock exchange or a recognized 
securities market within six months, and there is no statutory or other impediment to listing,  
or stocks for which at least two brokerage firms publicly quote a price representing an irrevocable purchase obligation 
continuously within 30 days prior to the purchase 
1 
10% 
F Investment  units 
2  50% 
f1  Investment units of investment funds registered in Hungary, including real estate investment trusts 
3 10% 
f2  Investment units of investment funds registered abroad, including real estate investment trusts 
3 10% 
G Mortgage-backed  certificates  25% 
g1  Mortgage-backed certificates issued by a mortgage lending institution registered in Hungary    
g2 Mortgage-backed  certificates  issued by a mortgage lending institution registered abroad    
H Exchange-traded  futures 
4   
I Exchange-traded  options 
4   
J Real  estate  5% 
Notes: Investments from the same issuer limited to 10%, /1 All these investments together, /2 For all, but 10% for each 
fund, and 30% from the same issuer.  /3 f1 and f2 investing in real estate and j together, /4 Only for hedging. 
78.       In general, the investment regime allows substantial room for asset managers to 
operate, and has not constrained or influenced portfolio strategies to a meaningful extent.  
As discussed in Section IV, portfolio strategies have been determined by other factors, 
such as the fiscal and macroeconomic environment, the limited supply of financial 
instruments, and the MPF’s internal approach to risk management.  Therefore, even if the 
HFSA adopted a prudent man approach to investment regulation, as prescribed in the 
recent EU Pensions Directive, it is unlikely that portfolio strategies would change.
22 Each 
pension fund is required to formulate and disclose an investment policy and its 
performance is monitored by the supervisor against this individual benchmark. 
                                                 
22 The recent EU Pensions Directive prescribes the switch to a prudent man rule in the EU, but Hungarian 
MPFs are not subject to the Directive, due to their legal construction.    
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Minimum Return Guarantee 
79.       The regulatory framework includes a minimum return guarantee that differs from 
the well known relative return guarantee adopted in Chile and the absolute return 
guarantee adopted in Switzerland.  In Chile and most other countries that adopted the 
Chilean system, the minimum return guarantee is relative – defined in relation to a band 
around the average rate of return of all pension funds over a rolling 36 month period.  If 
the rate of return is lower than the lower band, the asset manager needs to make up for the 
difference from its own minimum reserves.  If the return is higher than the upper band, the 
difference is placed in a profitability reserve in the pension fund.  The extreme herding by 
pension funds in Chile has led to very similar returns, implying that profitability reserves 
have not been built, nor asset managers have had to use their own minimum reserves to 
increase returns to the minimum.   
80.       The absolute guarantee in Switzerland (3 percent p.a.) is backed by an industry-
wide guarantee fund.  This construction, similar to pension benefit guarantee schemes in 
defined benefit systems, and bank deposit insurance schemes prevalent in many countries, 
raises moral hazard issues that have not yet been satisfactorily addressed in Switzerland. 
81.        In Hungary, the benchmark is not the industry’s average return, nor an absolute 
return, but a rate of return target that is determined primarily by a basket of long-term 
Government securities.  If the rate of return exceeds the upper band the excess would need 
to be placed in the liquidity reserve.  If the rate of return is lower than the lower band it 
should be increased to the minimum with transfers from the liquidity reserve.  The 
liquidity reserve cannot be larger than 4 percent of total assets.  Therefore, the rate of 
return guarantee in Hungary seems an internal smoothing device, designed to avoid 
extreme fluctuations relative to the benchmark.   
82.       The minimum return guarantee in Hungary does not seem to have affected 
investment policies in practice, possibly because there are questions of whether it can be 
legally enforced, and because the supervisor has set wide bands that make the guarantee 
effectively innocuous.  This pragmatic approach by the supervisor has been appropriate, 
because this type of guarantee could lead asset managers to adopt defensive strategies and 
avoid entirely assets with higher risk-return characteristics, and could also lead to extreme 
herding behavior among pension funds, even when the asset manager does not have the 
formal obligation to back the minimum return with its own resources.
23  
Accounting Standards and Valuation Rules 
83.       Pension fund portfolios have been marked to market daily by the custodian, based 
on settlement prices during the trading day.  The prices of listed and traded assets are 
provided by the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) and the Debt Management Agency 
(AKK).  Apparently, the prices of assets traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) market are 
also reported.  Assets which have not been traded for more than 30 days are valued by the 
lowest between the purchase price and the latest traded price.  Real estate is valued once a 
year.  It is not clear how other non-listed securities are valued, but exposure to these assets 
is very small.  Capital gains and losses are split between realized and unrealized, but both 
                                                 
23 Herding has also been observed in the UK, where pension funds do not need to meet formal minimum 
returns (Blake et al.  2002), but is probably intensified in the presence of formal guarantees.    
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are reflected in the individual accounts.  Until recently, custodians were required to submit 
this daily evaluation to the pension fund and the HFSA, but this requirement was recently 
abolished. 
84.       There are some rules that deviate from international accounting standards and 
distort the calculation and comparability of rates of return across different MPFs.  Some of 
these problems are related to the division of pension contributions among 3 types of 
reserves: (i) the coverage reserve, constituting the sum of all individual accounts in the 
pension fund; (ii) the operational reserve, used to meet operational costs; and (iii) the 
liquidity reserve, used to smooth rates of return.  Rate of return calculations are performed 
only on the coverage reserve and the portion of the operational reserve that is invested, 
i.e., only on a fraction of total contributions.  This implies that the custodian has no 
oversight on the total assets of the pension fund and that return performance cannot be 
accurately compared.  Although the operational reserve and, especially, the liquidity 
reserve, are relatively small, the methodology still implies some distortions.   
85.       Returns are calculated on a quarterly basis using a Dietz-modified type of formula 
(Appendix D).  The methodology recognizes the shortcomings of ignoring the timing of 
the cash flows by proposing to day-weight cash flows.  However, this is still an 
approximation of the true time weighted rate of return.  Furthermore, the formula assumes 
that between the beginning and the end of the quarter the market value of the portfolio 
changes linearly, another rough approximation.  The low frequency in calculating rates of 
return and the shortcomings in the methodology also hinder somewhat the comparability 
of rates of return across MPFs.  For instance, two pension funds with the same portfolios 
could have different performances simply due to the different time and weight of cash 
flows between the pension fund and the asset manager.   
86.       There are some additional gaps in rules and procedures that also hinder the 
accurate comparison of investment performance.  For example, performance evaluation 
against benchmarks is limited in Hungary, as there are no standards uniformly applied by 
the industry on how benchmarks should be re-balanced.  For instance, two asset managers 
could have the same investment mandate and the same benchmarks but use different 
rebalancing frequencies.  The different frequency translates in different benchmarks and 
therefore, in different performances.  Also, no uniform rules exist for charging brokerage 
fees on equities.  Some asset managers rightly charge the trading cost to the asset, while 
some other asset managers invoice the brokerage fees separately to the client, hence 
inflating their performance. 
Auditing Standards 
87.       Auditing rules and practices in the second pillar are generally reasonable, although 
there are still some specific gaps that would merit attention from the regulatory 
authorities.  All individual auditors of financial institutions need to be registered with the 
HFSA and licensed to audit a particular type of institutions.  Individual auditors cannot 
audit more than five companies in the same sector and are subject to a maximum five year 
rotation rule, although the rotation requirement does not apply to the auditing firm 
employing the individual auditor.   
88.       Auditing rules do not specify in detail the scope of the audit, but in practice 
auditors review all financial statements, IT systems, internal controls, and the  
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reconciliation of values with the custodian.  Pension fund audits have included these 
elements because auditors believe they are necessary for a sound assessment of fair 
valuation.  Therefore, the scope of the audit looks generally reasonable, and the HFSA has 
some influence on the scope through informal discussions with the industry.  However, 
the Law does not empower the HFSA to change/broaden the scope, according to special 
needs.   
89.       The supervisors can call the auditors for clarifications without need for approval of 
the pension fund board or management.  However, the HFSA does not have access to the 
auditors’ working papers.  Moreover, auditors have the legal obligation to report serious 
breaches of regulation and prudential guidelines directly to the supervisor, but the 
definition of what constitutes a “serious breach” is not specific and therefore open to 
interpretation.  Reporting obligations are more specific only in the case of suspected 
money laundering activities.  Finally, while the HFSA has formal sanctioning powers with 
respect to auditors, these sanctions seem to be ineffective due to the weak basis for 
determining liability in the auditing process.   
Disclosure Rules 
90.       MPFs need to disclose once a year the net and gross rates of return based on a 
Dietz-modified type of formula (Appendix D), opening and closing asset values for the 
year, investment allocation, and changes in investment policy.  Information to individual 
members should be disclosed at least once a year.  The provisions are detailed but there 
are no requirements to disclose rates of returns for the individual accounts, nor 
requirements to compare returns and fees on a systematic basis.   
91.       Disclosure requirements in Hungary are generally weak, especially considering 
that the Hungarian second pillar is based on open pension funds, and that the efficiency of 
this type of system requires high levels of disclosure and transparency.  The flaws in this 
area include not only the absence of standardized indicators that can be easily understood 
and compared by members, but also the lack of sufficient dissemination of the information 
and lack of efforts to educate consumers.   
92.       The fees of different pension funds cannot be easily compared because of their 
mixed structure.  Operational fees are charged on contributions while asset management 
fees are charged on assets, and members do not have access to information summarizing 
these two fees in a single indicator.  Furthermore, there are no efforts to project these fees 
in the long-run and provide estimates of their impact on replacement ratios.   
93.       Regulatory practices also impair the accurate comparison of returns across funds.  
This is because the current methodology, not based on unit accounting, produces 
indicators that are affected by the size and timing of the cash flows between the pension 
fund and the asset manager, as noted above.  Finally, comparability of rates of return is 
undermined by the absence of uniform performance standards, as also noted above.  The 
HFSA is discussing with the industry the adoption of Global Investment Performance 
Standards (GIPS).   
Supervision 
94.       Hungary was the first CEE country to create an integrated supervision agency –the 
HFSA – with supervision powers over the whole financial sector, except for credit  
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cooperatives.  The current legal provisions provide a reasonable degree of independence 
and resources to the HFSA, as well as adequate enforcement powers, although the HFSA 
does not have the formal power to issue binding regulations, and there are some specific 
reporting obligations to the Government that have raised some concerns.   
95.       The HFSA has a board responsible for supervision strategy and a management 
responsible for its implementation in day-to-day operations.  The Chairman of the Board 
is appointed by Parliament for a term of six years, and cannot be easily removed.  The 
other members of the board are appointed by the President of the Republic by indication 
of the Prime Minister.  The General Manager is appointed by the Prime Minister.  The 
separate responsibility of the Legislative and Executive powers in appointing the highest 
governing positions at HFSA could potentially create situations of friction within the 
leadership of HSFA and undermine the smooth development of operations in the future. 
96.       The HFSA has no formal regulatory powers outside the area of anti-money 
laundering.  Secondary regulations are only issued in two forms: (i) Government decrees 
issued by the Council of Ministers, or (ii) Ministerial decrees.  The HFSA can draft 
regulation, but this regulation needs to be proposed to the Ministry of Finance, and issued 
by the Ministry or the Cabinet.  The Ministry has generally issued regulations proposed by 
the HFSA, but this arrangement is still sub-optimal, as it opens the possibility for delays 
and external interference in regulation.   
97.       The risks related to the lack of formal regulatory powers are partly mitigated by 
the issuance of resolutions and guidelines.  Strictly speaking, resolutions are enforcement 
decisions applying to individual institutions, while guidelines are non-binding 
interpretations of laws and regulations.  However, resolutions and guidelines have 
constituted de facto a body of binding secondary regulations applicable to all supervised 
entities.  This outcome has been in good part due to a large number of court rulings 
favoring the supervisory authority in legal disputes, and using previously issued 
resolutions and guidelines as the basis for the ruling.  Therefore, both HFSA staff and 
market participants consider that these resolutions and guidelines have, at least to some 
extent, offset the deficiencies caused by the lack of formal regulatory powers. 
98.       The HFSA is financed through the imposition of supervisory fees on market 
participants, which gives the agency considerable financial independence.  The Ministry 
of Finance approves the budget proposed by the HFSA, but the approval is not 
conditioned on a detailed allocation of resources.  The Law requires only that overall 
limits on personnel, development and operations, be included in the budget.  Moreover, 
the HFSA can carry over its surpluses to the next fiscal period.  The agency has been able 
to offer competitive salaries and to attract and retain qualified staff.   
99.       The Chairman of the HFSA needs to report quarterly to the Minister of Finance 
and annually to Parliament.  The Chairman of the HFSA has used the quarterly reports as 
a vehicle for proposing regulation, and has also disseminated these reports.  This 
initiative, combined with the practice of more frequent consultations with the industry, has 
been well received by officials and market participants, as they reflect a policy of greater 
transparency in the formulation and enforcement of regulations.  However, one particular 
legal provision that has raised concern relates to the Finance Minister’s power to interfere  
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in HFSA decisions.  Although this power has not been exercised, it still opens the 
possibility for political interference in supervisory actions. 
100.     The HFSA has made progress in moving towards consolidated supervision and is 
also making efforts to move from a compliance approach to a more modern risk-based 
approach.  There are currently 23 professionals supervising pension funds, out of a total 
staff of 530.  These supervisors perform both off-site and on-site supervision, but there is 
a lead supervisor for each of the major funds.   
101.     The supervision of pension funds has adopted elements of risk-based supervision.  
The off-site unit collects relevant information from many different sources, builds a 
variety of indicators, and tries to compile an overall risk rating reflecting its assessment of 
market, operational, and personnel risks that should be used to determine priorities and 
allocate supervisory resources.  The on-site inspection program also seems to follow a 
risk-based approach.  Besides the obvious market risks associated with the investment 
activity of pension funds, the on-site manual directs inspectors to assess risks related to 
the membership base of the funds, risks related to external service providers, and risks 
associated with management and governance structures.  The manual provides some 
description of the internal procedures and controls that are expected to be in place for all 
these risks to be adequately identified and monitored by the supervised entities. 
B.   Main Regulatory Issues in the Payout Phase 
Review of Main Payout Regulations 
102.     The pension reform approved in July 1997 and implemented in January 1998 
included a rule allowing retirees fifteen years to choose between lump-sums and annuities, 
but mandating annuities after this transition period, i.e., from 2013 on.
24 After that date, 
retiring members will be able to choose from four types of annuities, namely, (i) a single 
life annuity; (ii) a joint life annuity; (iii) the combination of a fixed term joint annuity 
(covering the spouse or other beneficiary for a fixed period) with a single life annuity; and 
(iv) the combination of a single life annuity with a fixed term annuity, covering the spouse 
or other beneficiary for a fixed period after the main beneficiary’s death.   
103.     All annuities are fixed (i.e., not linked to market returns) and indexed to a basket 
of prices and wages with equal weights – the Swiss indexation formula – the same 
formula used to adjust first pillar benefits.  Annuities need to be calculated from unisex 
mortality tables, i.e., there can be no differentiation of annuity payouts by gender.  
Married members do not need to contract joint life annuities.  Therefore, survivors 
(spouses and young children) are not necessarily insured against the risk of death, 
although they still get a benefit from the first pillar.   
104.     Annuities can be provided by MPFs themselves, provided that they meet a number 
of conditions and are licensed by the HFSA to offer these products.  The conditions 
include a minimum size of 25,000 members (although smaller funds can still apply), the 
elaboration of benefit regulations, the preparation of specific mortality tables, the 
                                                 
24 This period of 15 years was originally related to the concession of a minimum benefit guarantee to 
switching members until the age of 47, and to the minimum retirement age of 62.  The guarantee was 
subsequently eliminated.  
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constitution of some reserves (examined below), and the employment of an actuary.  
Alternatively, the pension fund may offer annuities to its members through a collective 
contract with a life insurance company.  Finally, any individual member has the right to 
buy an annuity from any licensed life insurance company, if he or she is not satisfied with 
the annuity offered by his pension fund or with the annuity offered by the contracted life 
insurance company.   
105.     Pension funds that decide to offer annuities may price them freely (subject to the 
constraints mentioned above, including the indexation formula and the unisex table) but 
need to disclose to the supervisor all the assumptions and factors utilized in the pricing 
decision.  Members that become annuitants have their individual balances transferred to a 
service account, which is the liability of the pension fund to the retired member.  The 
collection of service accounts is called the service reserves of the pension fund (technical 
reserves in most jurisdictions).  The assets backing the service reserves are not subject to a 
different investment regime from that applying to the accumulation phase.   
106.     When the member retires and the annuity contract is issued, the pension fund 
should not only create a service account but also add 0.3 percent of the value of the 
account to a demographic reserve, presumably intended to cover longevity risk.  The law 
specifies rules for transferring funds from the service accounts to the demographic 
reserves, depending on the actual mortality experience.  If mortality proves higher than 
projected there can be a transfer from the demographic reserve to the service reserve—i.e., 
the adjustment of benefits may exceed the Swiss formula.  If mortality proves lower than 
projected there is a transfer from the demographic reserve to the service reserve, and the 
demographic reserve is replenished from the operating reserve, which is formed from the 
flow of contributions.  The law also specifies the possibility for transfers from the 
liquidity reserve.  In an attempt to avoid the deliberate underestimation of annuity 
liabilities, the law limits the technical interest rate to a rate of 1.5 percent above the Swiss 
indexation rate in the same year.  The law does not explicitly require reserves to cover 
investment risk, especially the mismatches that may occur between the structure of assets 
and liabilities. 
The Main Deficiencies in the Payout Phase 
107.     The regulatory framework for the payout phase contains several deficiencies that 
need to be addressed in the coming years.  The Government is aware of these flaws and 
has created a working group that is expected to redesign the framework and prepare the 
ground for the development of an efficient market for retirement products.  The working 
group will need to revise all aspects of the regulatory framework, including the menu of 
retirement products, the design of each individual instrument, and the regulation of 
intermediaries licensed to offer these products. 
108.     The menu of retirement products is probably too restricted and unable to meet the 
needs of retirees with different characteristics and degrees of risk aversion.  The existence 
of a first pillar benefit providing a replacement ratio of roughly 45 percent for full career 
workers allows regulators to consider a more flexible menu, including partial lump-sums 
subject to restrictions, phased withdrawals and a wider range of annuities.  At the same 
time, survivors may not be sufficiently protected in the new system, as the survivor  
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benefit in the reduced first pillar is smaller than the one in the former system and possibly 
not adequate and married members are not forced to buy joint life annuities.
25 
109.     The Swiss indexation formula was possibly imposed on the second pillar because 
of the perception that price indexation would imply a less generous benefit for the 
annuitant.  This is a wrong perception caused by the failure to differentiate between 
unfunded and funded systems.  Different indexation formulas in a defined benefit (DB), 
PAYG system do imply different levels of generosity for the individual retiree.  More 
specifically, the net present value (NPV) of DB-PAYG benefits adjusted by a wage 
indexation formula is larger than the NPV of benefits adjusted by a Swiss formula, and the 
latter is larger than the NPV of benefits adjusted by a pure price indexation formula.  Of 
course, the other side of the coin is larger PAYG deficits generated by the more generous 
indexation formulas, and a larger implicit pension debt of the public sector.  The 
intertemporal budget constraint implies that some cohorts will pay for the larger implicit 
pension debt generated by a generous formula, most typically the young cohorts and 
future generations.   
110.     In a fully-funded second pillar, the final balance that generates the annuity 
payment is the same, whether the benefits are adjusted by wages, prices, or any 
combination of the two.  If the risk for the provider is the same, the net present value of 
annuities adjusted by different indexation formulas should also be the same.  This means 
that annuities adjusted by the Swiss formula would need to start at a lower level than 
annuities indexed to prices, because they are expected to increase at higher rates during 
the retirement period (assuming that real wages will grow during this period).   
111.     However, annuities indexed to the Swiss formula imply more risk to the provider, 
because the provider is exposed to movements of two stochastic variables, prices and 
wages, and probably will not have the instruments to hedge this risk.  While many 
countries have developed price indexed financial instruments that allow providers to 
hedge inflation risk, there are no instruments allowing providers to hedge wage risk.
26 
This implies that providers would either charge a very high risk premium to cover 
themselves against this risk (i.e., very low annuities) or avoid offering annuities 
altogether.   
112.     The rules allowing annuities to be offered by pension funds, or by insurance 
companies through collective arrangements, or by individual search, were apparently 
designed with the objective of enhancing competition and protecting the consumer.  
However, the rules allowing pension funds to offer annuities were poorly designed and 
may ultimately lead to insolvency and/or unintended transfers across cohorts, ultimately 
harming contributing workers and retirees. 
                                                 
25 Disability and survivorship insurance in the contribution/accumulation phase is also restricted to the first 
pillar.  The design of this type of insurance in the new mixed system also merits a review by policy-makers.   
26 Many defined benefit pension funds hold equity to match the increase in wages during the accumulation 
phase.  This strategy is frequently justified with the argument that the shares of labor and capital income in 
GDP are stable and, therefore, equity returns accumulated for long periods of time should not be too 
different from wage growth accumulated over the same period.  This argument bears some relation to the 
hypothesis that stock returns are mean-reverting.  However, this strategy may still expose pension funds to 
extreme drops in equity prices and to under-funding.    
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113.     The current regulatory framework for the payout phase does not address 
effectively the complex risks involved in the provision of contracts with very long 
durations such as fixed annuities, particularly the longevity and investment risks.  The 
demographic reserve that pension funds would have to build is too small and unrelated to 
the size of the risk pool.  This is aggravated by the lack of sound cohort mortality tables 
for the population that will start retiring in 2013.   
114.     The situation is even worse with respect to investment risk.  Pension funds would 
not need to build reserves to address this particular risk, a serious regulatory flaw, 
especially considering that the absence of appropriate hedging instruments would imply 
severe mismatches between assets and liabilities and substantial exposure to this risk.  The 
need to adjust annuities according to the Swiss formula would prove particularly 
problematic, due to the absence of appropriate hedging instruments in Hungary or any 
other country in the EU.  The rule that imposes a maximum value for the technical rate 
used to value liabilities is also problematic—the technical rate would be linked to a 
variable (wage growth) that is unrelated to market returns, and that could increase sharply 
in some periods due to political considerations (such as the early 2000s), leading to a 
severe underestimation of liabilities. 
115.     The regulatory framework contains some risk-sharing clauses apparently designed 
to prevent insolvency, but that will imply unintended and undesirable transfers across 
cohorts.  For example, the rule that allows the modest demographic reserve to be 
replenished from the operating reserve would imply transfers from newly retired members 
and, especially, members in the accumulation phase.  There are examples of risk-sharing 
schemes that address longevity risks well, such as the scheme employed by the TIAA-
CREF in the US, but the rules of this type of scheme are better designed and transparent, 
and do not imply transfers from members in the accumulation phase to cover imbalances 
in the payout phase.   
VIII.   CONCLUSIONS AND REFORM AGENDA 
A.   Review of Main Findings 
116.     The structure of the Hungarian second pillar is unique among reforming countries.  
MPFs have been structured as open mutual benefit associations operating under a two 
board structure.  The members of these boards are elected among fund members and 
should represent their interests.  In practice, most MPFs are controlled by the sponsors 
that incurred the start up costs.  This resulted in a hybrid second pillar, with most MPFs 
controlled by financial institutions, some MPFs sponsored by large employers, and only 
three independent MPFs.  The first group of MPFs account for the bulk of the second 
pillar’s members and assets, despite charging higher fees.   
117.     The second pillar has had a mixed performance since its introduction in 1988.  In 
2004 total assets amounted to only 4 percent of GDP, a low ratio by comparison with 
other second pillars with the same period of implementation.  The slow growth of assets 
has been due to the slow growth of contributions and the weak average return 
performance.  The slow growth of contributions was due to a good extent to the policies 
followed during 1998-2002, a period characterized by lack of political support for the 
reform.  The weak average return performance was due to an undiversified portfolio,  
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consisting primarily of relatively low yield Government securities, and to the weak 
performance of equity markets during most of the implementation period.   
118.     Since 2003 there has been an improvement in the system’s performance.  
Contributions have increased again, reflecting the return of the reformist socialist 
government and the adoption of supportive policies towards the second pillar.  Return 
performance improved considerably in 2004 and remained strong in the first half of 2005, 
boding well for the future of the system.  Despite the recent improvement in performance, 
the historical performance of the Hungarian second pillar still does not compare favorably 
with the performance of the first pillar due to a particularly lax wage policy until 2003.  
While nominal wage growth has stabilized at around 6 percent in the last two years and 
nominal net returns have been more than double that figure, the 1998 – 2005 annualized 
average real net rate of return of MPFs is still only 3.9 percent compared to a real wage 
growth of 5.3 percent over the same period. 
119.     Average fees in the Hungarian second pillar compare favorably with fees charged 
in most other reforming countries with the same period of implementation, especially 
when expressed as a share of contributions.  The absence of any meaningful marketing 
expenses in the case of Hungary would explain the favorable comparison with other 
reforming countries.   Fees charged by independent MPFs and MPFs sponsored by 
employers look particularly low.  However, if the current segmentation and fee structure 
are maintained, the costs of the Hungarian system would become more evident in the 
future, particularly in the case of MPFs sponsored by financial institutions.  It is difficult 
to predict how the system will evolve, but positive outcomes may depend on improving 
transparency and consumer awareness, enhancing competition and reducing the high level 
of fragmentation.   
120.     The pension reform has so far contributed only modestly to the development of 
Hungary’s capital market.  This has been due to several factors, including the modest 
growth of the second pillar, the sharp growth of bank lending in the first half of the 2000s, 
after a period of restructuring and privatization in the 1990s, the Government debt 
management strategies that have been adopted in the pre-Euro period, and some remaining 
regulatory glitches.  It is probable that the stronger growth of the second pillar and the 
slower growth of bank lending will tend to induce a stronger development of domestic 
capital market instruments in the future.  The accession into the Euro zone may have some 
mixed effects – the reduction in some risks and the lengthening of time horizons will tend 
to favor the development of domestic instruments with longer durations, but access to 
these instruments elsewhere in the EU will tend to reduce the need for their development 
domestically.  In any case, the development of the capital market will also depend on the 
removal of all remaining regulatory impediments.   
121.     Regulators face even more important challenges in the payout phase.  The 
regulatory framework for the payout phase is very deficient and needs to be overhauled.  
The range of retirement instruments is limited, survivors may not be adequately protected, 
and pension funds are allowed to offer annuities subject to weak investment and capital 
regulations, and without access to instruments to hedge investment and longevity risk.  
Fortunately, regulators have some time to improve the framework and promote the 
development of financial instruments, as pension funds are only required to offer annuities  
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from 2013 on.  The recent creation of a task force to review the whole regulatory 
framework for the payout phase has been an important positive initial step.   
122.     The menu of regulatory measures that should be considered to ensure that the 
second pillar performs its expected role includes those that would apply to the 
accumulation phase and those that would apply to the payout phase.  Regarding the 
accumulation phase, the set of measures that should be considered includes those that 
would primarily strengthen its stability and resiliency, and those that would improve 
market structure and performance.  Regarding the payout phase, the set of measures would 
need to be comprehensive, amounting to a redesign of the regulatory framework.  Finally, 
progress in developing a wider range of financial instruments and risk management tools 
would improve the performance of both the accumulation and payout phases of the new 
pension system. 
B.   Improving the Regulatory Framework for the Accumulation Phase 
123.     The first years of implementation of the new second pillar were affected by lack of 
support to the reform, resulting in slower growth of contributions and assets and 
uncertainty among institutions and contributors.  This has not benefited any of the 
involved parties, because the performance of the second pillar and its contribution to 
capital market development depend to a good extent on its size.  In order to ensure a 
steady growth of the system in coming years, it would be necessary to keep the 
contribution rate at its current level of 8 percent, maintain the rules of the transition from 
the old to the new pension system, and also maintain the contribution ceiling stable in 
relation to the average covered wage. 
124.     In addition to pension policy measures designed to ensure a steady growth of the 
system, there are specific regulatory measures that would also contribute to a more stable 
and resilient second pillar.  For example, licensing and governance rules could be 
improved through the extension of fit and proper tests to all board members.  Also, the 
external audit function could be more integrated into the supervisory process, by 
empowering the HFSA to change/broaden the scope of the audit, if the circumstances 
justify this action, providing access to all audit results, including working papers, 
clarifying the concept of “serious breach” of regulations and the reporting obligations of 
auditors to supervisors, and strengthening sanctions. 
125.     Regarding the structure and performance of the second pillar, one of the main 
challenges faced by Hungarian regulators is to ensure that costs and fees are contained and 
remain reasonable during the whole period of accumulation.  In order to achieve this goal, 
a number of policy measures may be considered. 
126.     One possibility to reduce costs associated with revenue collection (one of the 
major cost items) involves the introduction of an agency charged with the responsibility of 
collecting contributions and transferring them to MPFs.  The agency could be owned by 
the industry or be an independent and reputable service provider selected through bidding 
on a periodical basis.  The agency would need to be regulated along the lines of a private 
monopoly regulation.  Particular care would be needed in designing its governance 
structure due to the sensitive information on individual accounts managed by such an 
agency.  If the provider is owned by the industry (a possibility that is being seriously  
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considered by one of the association of MPFs) the HFSA would need to pay particular 
attention to the fee structure, to avoid discrimination against small MPFs and to ensure the 
contestability of the market. 
127.     In order to ensure that fees charged by MPFs are contained at reasonable levels, 
especially the MPFs sponsored by financial institutions, a number of policy measures 
could be considered, including a substantial strengthening of disclosure requirements, 
efforts to improve consumer education, changes in the rules for the allocation of 
undecided new members, and changes in fee regulations.   
128.     An open pension system that relies on informed choices by consumers to operate 
efficiently should provide information on critical indicators of fund performance, 
especially returns and fees.  Disclosure requirements in Hungary are deficient, not 
providing consumers the means to make informed decisions, “vote with their feet”, and 
select better performing funds.  The problems in disclosure include not only the confusion 
caused by the mixed fee structure but also the lack of easy access to essential information 
and clear comparisons across pension funds.   
129.     One of the first measures that should be considered involves the systematic 
computation of indicators summarizing all the fees charged by the MPFs, and expressing 
total fees as a share of contributions and assets.  The information on fees should be 
combined with information on returns to form a coherent picture that is easily understood 
by members and that can be used to compare fund performance.  In a second stage, 
regulators may consider computing other supplementary indicators, such as the estimation 
of ranges of replacement ratios under reasonable and transparent assumptions,
27 and even 
charge ratios. 
130.     The information on returns and fees charged by each MPF should be provided at 
least on a quarterly basis in the HFSA’s website.  In each quarter the HFSA could produce 
a press release highlighting the results and the differences and encouraging the publication 
of this information in the main newspapers, magazines, and other media.  The annual 
report sent by MPFs to members should contain not only information on the individual 
MPF’s performance but also simple tables comparing performance with the rest of the 
industry. 
131.     Regulators are sometimes concerned that systematic comparisons will lead 
consumers to adopt a short-term horizon or “chase returns” (i.e., switch to pension funds 
that may have had a better return performance recently but not on a systematic basis).  
This concern is generally more valid for returns than for fees, as the former variable is 
more volatile than the latter, and could be addressed by the computation of average 
accumulated rates of return over relevant periods.  Moreover, the segmented structure of 
the Hungarian second pillar and the typical herding behavior suggests that on average 
there will probably be larger differences in fees than returns.   
132.     In addition to improvements in disclosure, regulators may also consider changes in 
the rules for allocating new members, especially undecided new members.  In Hungary, 
new entrants that do not select a fund are usually assigned to a fund chosen by the 
employer.  Currently, the employer has an incentive to induce new entrants to choose the 
                                                 
27 This type of exercise is already being performed by the pension fund supervision in Chile, the SAFP.  
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same fund selected by the majority of employees, in order to reduce his own 
administrative paperwork.  However, this fund is rarely one of the funds charging low 
fees.  If the new entrant does not make a formal selection, he or she is allocated to a 
default fund on a regional basis, which also tends to be one of the funds charging high 
fees.     
133.     If larger numbers of new entrants started selecting the low fee funds, this could 
increase the overall degree of competition and lead the other funds to decrease their fees 
as well.    In order to achieve this outcome, employers should be directed to show a table 
comparing cost and return performance of all funds to new entrants, in order to ensure 
better informed choices.  New employees should sign a form indicating their awareness 
about the alternatives to the fund preferred by the employer.  An alternative and more 
assertive policy measure designed to reduce consumer inertia, enhance competition and 
reduce fees, would entail allocating new undecided members to one of the three funds (or 
other relevant percentile) charging the lowest fees in the preceding twelve months. 
134.     In addition to changes in the rules for new entrants, regulators could also consider 
rules facilitating switching to lower cost funds.  For example, members could be allowed 
to switch by simply using the internet.  Another measure involves allowing the target fund 
to process the relevant paperwork on behalf of workers, to prevent the origin fund from 
creating administrative obstacles to workers wishing to switch funds.  A more assertive 
policy measure would entail allowing switching only to lower cost funds.  
135.     Some of these solutions may seem excessively intrusive, but the concern with high 
fees and consumer inertia has led regulators in other countries to implement several of 
them.  For example, Mexican regulators have adopted a very assertive set of policies since 
2002, designed to reduce the very high level of commissions.  These have included much 
better disclosure rules, the allocation of undecided new entrants to the lowest fee funds,
28 
and the prohibition for members to switch funds more than once a year, unless they switch 
to a lower fee fund.   
136.     Although it is still early to quantify the full impact of these new regulations in 
Mexico, they have succeeded in reducing projected average long-run fees from 1.1 
percent of assets to 0.7 percent of assets, as noted in Figure 15.   It is noteworthy that the 
decline in the average fee was caused both by reductions in fees by individual incumbents 
and the entry of new companies charging low fees.  It is difficult to associate the decline 
in the average fee over this period to specific policy measures, but the decline 
undoubtedly reflects the market response to a credible commitment by the regulator to 
lower fees in the second pillar.      
                                                 
28 Workers who have not elected a pension fund are assigned every year to the bottom quartile of the cost 
distribution and inversely proportionally to the costs charged by each pension fund.  In other words, the least 
costly fund within the bottom quartile receives the largest share of members while the most costly fund 
within the bottom quartile receives the lowest share.  
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137.     The problems related to the comparability of rates of return are not as severe as 
those related to the comparability of fees, but there is scope for improvements in this area 
as well.  The HFSA might consider requiring MPFs to calculate true time weighted rate of 
return similarly to what done by mutual funds.  The HFSA may also consider unifying the 
coverage, operational, and liquidity reserves (or at least the first two) and require MPFs to 
calculate rates of return on total contributions.  Finally, the HFSA may promote the 
diffusion of Global Performance Investment Standards (GIPS) and require asset managers 
for MPFs to be GIPS certified.  The adoption of GIPS by all asset managers would greatly 
improve the comparability of performance evaluations across asset managers.
29  
138.     Another measure that is frequently used to monitor performance and contain 
excessive fees, involves the publication of returns on equity and other indicators of 
profitability of asset managers and other financial institutions.  Asset management 
companies provide a valuable service and are entitled to earn profits in a competitive 
financial sector.  However, asset management companies operating in second pillars 
sometimes generate much higher returns on equity than other financial institutions such as 
banks and insurance companies, while taking much lower risks.  Disclosing these 
indicators on a systematic basis would enhance the awareness of regulators, policy-
makers, and the public at large of the existence of market inefficiencies leading to 
excessive profits, increasing the pressure for policy corrections.   
139.     Before embarking on a major effort to improve disclosure and consumer 
awareness and change key regulations, it would be important to assess whether the low 
cost funds have the capacity to absorb a larger number of members.  Several of these 
funds indicate that they would be interested in absorbing more members, even in the 
absence of a profit motive, because a larger membership would reduce their fixed costs.  
Some managers may also benefit from a larger membership in terms of bonuses and 
                                                 
29 GIPS can be downloaded at http://www.cfainstitute.org/standards/pps/gips.html.  
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prestige.  However, some of these funds may not have the IT infrastructure and the 
organizational capacity to absorb a large number of members in a short period of time.  
Therefore, efforts to promote switching to the lower cost funds should be preceded by 
efforts to encourage the build up of their administrative capacity and ensure the continuity 
of fund operations.  
140.     It is possible that the combination of all these measures would be sufficient to 
address the problem of consumer inertia and market segmentation, reducing fees and 
benefiting all second pillar members.  However, regulators should also consider more 
forceful policy actions if these measures fail to produce meaningful effects.   
141.     One possibility would involve enforcing more explicit and transparent procedures 
for the selection of asset managers and administrators by MPF boards, especially MPFs 
sponsored by financial institutions.  This type of action would amount to enforcing the 
fiduciary obligation of board members, and would also seem consistent with reforms 
being proposed in Chile and other reforming countries, involving the adoption of bidding 
schemes designed to strengthen price competition and reduce fees.
30  
142.     Performing a fiduciary obligation that already exists under the law would seem to 
be an obvious duty of both members and regulators.  In Hungary this would expose the 
inconsistencies in the construction of the second pillar, and could lead to very tense and 
unusual situations.  Indeed, enforcing this rule could result in situations where the board 
members of the MPF, who are employees of the sponsoring financial institution, would be 
effectively forced to hand the profitable pension business of that MPF to a competitor that 
did not incur the initial costs, and also put their own jobs at risk.  This measure would 
effectively represent a major structural change hurting the interests of several incumbents, 
and for this reason would not be easily implemented. 
143.     Former debates in Hungary on how to improve the system’s structure have focused 
on the “demutualization” of the MPFs.  This would entail their legal transformation into 
pension funds without boards and managed by a single pension fund management 
company, along the lines of the second pillar in Chile and most other reforming countries, 
including neighboring countries such as Poland.  This type of reform could generate 
benefits, such as greater transparency and accountability of the management company, but 
would not necessarily improve competition and reduce fees.  Moreover, if the MPFs 
sponsored by employers were also “demutualized”, lower cost alternatives could be 
removed entirely, not contributing to competition and efficiency.   
144.     It is possible that efforts to improve disclosure and consumer awareness, combined 
with new rules for allocating new entrants, will lead to some switching to the lower cost 
MPFs, and lead the other MPFs to reduce their fees to avoid further loss of membership 
and market share.  If this positive outcome materializes, regulators may not need to 
consider other measures.  However, if these measures fail to reduce market segmentation 
and fees charged by some MPFs become excessive in the future, regulators may consider 
more radical reforms.  This could include the “demutualization” of MPFs, but combined 
with bidding arrangements, or combined with the move to a Swedish type of arrangement, 
involving a single basic service provider charged with the collection of revenues and the 
                                                 
30 See Valdés -Prieto (2005).  
 
- 49 -
management of blind individual accounts, and the licensing of a larger number of asset 
managers.  This type of arrangement was designed to maximize economies of scale and 
competition in small financial systems and could prove a feasible alternative for Hungary.   
C.   Overhauling the Regulatory Framework for the Payout Phase 
145.     The 1997 pension law created a grace period for policy-makers and regulators to 
review and improve the design of the payout phase, and the creation of a task force to deal 
with the problem is a positive and commendable step.  Given the weak regulatory 
framework for the payout phase, the task force will need to consider a complete overhaul 
of the regulatory and institutional framework.  The following options might be considered 
during such a review. 
146.     As mentioned before, the existence of a first pillar benefit providing a replacement 
ratio of roughly 40-45 percent of the final wage provides room for a more flexible menu 
of retirement products.  Partial lump-sums could be allowed with restrictions.  For 
example, the partial lump-sum could be restricted through a rule imposing a minimum 
second pillar pension equal to a multiple of the minimum pension, or other relevant 
benchmark.  Phased withdrawals could be introduced, also with some restrictions, 
designed to prevent a rapid depletion of the second pillar balance.  This could be achieved 
by a formula including life expectancy, such as the formula applied in Chile. 
147.     Other types of annuities could be considered, especially guaranteed annuities that 
provide protection against longevity risk and also some room for bequests upon the death 
of the beneficiary during the guaranteed period.  They have proved popular in countries 
with a high degree of annuitization such as Chile.  There are constructions that allow 
annuitants some room to deal with the annuity rate risk (i.e.  the risk of a drop in interest 
rates and annuity rates at the time of retirement).  These include the staggered purchase of 
fixed annuities in the period preceding retirement and adjustable annuities (fixed annuities 
that are changed every three or five years according to the movements of long-run interest 
rates).  Adjustable annuities also imply less investment risk for the provider, allowing the 
provider to offer a higher initial annuity payment.  Variable annuities linked with a riskier 
portfolio could also be considered, although they would need to be restricted to higher 
income consumers.   
148.     Regulators could consider allowing phased withdrawals and non-fixed annuities, 
but only through a combination of these products and a fixed annuity, in order to enhance 
insurance against longevity and investment risk in the second pillar.  However, the greater 
flexibility in the range of products allowed might need to be accompanied by more 
stringent conditions in other areas.  For example, married retirees might need to buy joint 
life annuities or withdrawals in order to provide greater protection for their spouses. 
149.     One of the most important changes that will need to be introduced in instrument 
design is the removal of the Swiss indexation formula in the second pillar benefit, and its 
replacement by a price indexation formula.  As mentioned before, the move from Swiss to 
price indexation does not imply a reduction in the level of generosity of the second pillar 
benefit, relative to the first pillar benefit, as the net present value of the second pillar 
annuity would be roughly the same.  In fact, the move to price indexation might increase 
the net present value of the annuity due to the sharp reduction of the risks for the provider.   
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Some providers may simply refuse to offer annuities indexed to the Swiss formula, 
leading to a collapse of the annuities market. 
150.     If regulators believe that it would be important to offer a product similar to a 
Swiss-indexed annuity, they could consider a price-indexed annuity with an escalating 
clause, say, 1 percent above CPI inflation.  Providers would find this liability more 
acceptable, because they would not be exposed to wage growth risk, a risk that cannot be 
easily hedged.  However, the initial level of this escalating real annuity would be lower 
than a simple price-indexed annuity, and most consumers might not find it attractive for 
this reason.   
151.     Pension funds should not be allowed to offer annuities but only phased 
withdrawals.  An alternative but maybe less preferable solution would entail allowing 
pension funds to offer annuities provided that they adopt sound and transparent risk-
sharing rules, that adjust annuity payments to unexpected improvements in longevity, 
impose a sound investment regime for the payout phase, impose substantial reserves to 
cover investment risk, and also tie benefits to imbalances between assets and liabilities 
resulting from investment losses.  The rules would not allow non-transparent and 
unintended transfers from members in the accumulation phase. 
152.     Fixed annuities exposing the provider to longevity and investment risks should 
only be offered by licensed life insurance companies subject to proper regulation and 
supervision.  However, this would still require strengthening investment and capital 
regulations in the insurance sector, preparing the sector to deal with the specific risks 
involved in this type of product.   
D.   Promoting the Development of Financial Instruments 
153.     Looking beyond debt management in the pre-Euro accession period, the authorities 
need to develop a strategy to build a market in long-term government bonds, including 
indexed bonds that would serve as an inflation hedge for annuities providers during the 
payout phase of the pension system.  This phase will begin for mandatory members of the 
system in 2013 but may begin for voluntary members before that date.   
154.     It is true that governments in several EU countries have been issuing very long-
term bonds, including indexed bonds, and Hungarian institutional investors would have 
access to these instruments without exposing themselves to currency risk after Hungary 
joins the Euro.
31 However, over reliance on foreign debt issues in the EU to meet the 
needs of domestic institutional investors may not be an appropriate strategy.  Foreign 
governments frequently tailor their long-term issues to the needs of their own institutional 
investors, typically defined benefit pension funds, which face a matching problem that 
may be different from that of annuity providers.  Moreover, these issues could be 
infrequent, irregular, and generally insufficient.  Furthermore, local inflation rates could 
be different, even inside the same currency area, exposing local annuity providers to basis 
risk (i.e., an imperfect hedge against local inflation risk).  Finally, if Hungarian 
institutional investors go systematically to other EU countries to meet their hedging 
requirements, this could complicate Hungary’s own debt management program.   
                                                 
31 See de Haan and Wolswijk (2005) and G10 (2005).  
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155.     Therefore, the development of a domestic Government debt market may remain an 
essential condition for the development of sound and healthy pension and insurance 
sectors, and especially important for the development of an annuities market.  Moreover, 
progress in developing further the Government debt market may also determine the future 
development of other domestic fixed income markets, such as mortgage, corporate, and 
infrastructure bonds.   
156.     The mortgage bond market could be developed further through a number of 
measures, including: (i) increasing the investment limit in pension fund portfolios; (ii) 
reducing the risk-weighting applied to well-rated mortgage bonds for capital adequacy 
purposes (iii) reviewing the current methodology for rating mortgage bonds adopted by 
rating agencies.  Due to their novelty, mortgage bonds were granted only one maximum 
notch above unsecured bonds, but rating agencies might be willing to revise rating criteria 
to better differentiate the impact of a high-quality cover pool. 
157.     The corporate bond market will probably develop slowly, as large companies in 
Hungary have had easy access to bank and inter-company loans at very favorable rates.  
However, the attractiveness of this instrument will probably increase over time, as many 
companies will probably feel the need to diversify their liabilities and increase their 
duration.  To encourage the first issues and facilitate the development of this market, the 
Government may consider completing the implementation of the EU Prospectus Directive, 
and also consider removing the requirement that the company should be rated before 
issuing a bond if liabilities are greater than equity. 
158.     Regarding infrastructure bonds, the government may consider the development of 
a “Structured Finance Act”, along the lines of the model adopted in Chile and more 
recently Brazil, which creates the legal framework for tools commonly used in PPP and 
municipal finance.  These tools can include revenue intercepts, third-party custody of 
revenues, the securing of bond payments with specific revenue flows, and bond pooling 
intermediaries to consolidate smaller issues into larger ones.  The government may also 
consider removing the requirement in the Capital Markets Act that companies can only 
issue bonds if they have been in operation one full year, unless guaranteed by the 
government or if the bond issue is backed by specific assets pledged as collateral.   
159.     Regarding private equity, the government may consider adding a section to the 
Capital Markets Act (CMA) to govern venture capital and private equity which provides 
for governance and appropriate consumer protection, but does not overly limit the 
flexibility of fund managers.  This section of the CMA can then replace the Venture 
Capital Act in its entirety.  Developing this instrument may also require coordinated 
efforts with regulators in other CEE countries, designed to promote regional private equity 
funds, as Hungary’s small size may limit the development of attractive funds offering 
sufficient risk diversification and exit possibilities. 
160.     Last but not least, the development of a wider menu of domestic financial 
instruments will also depend on the maintenance of a more supportive fiscal policy.  The 
sharp expansion of fiscal deficits in the early 2000s, above and beyond the revenue losses 
to the second pillar, has contributed to a decline in national savings and investment, 
hindering private issues of instruments designed to finance private capital formation.  This 
has contributed, in turn, to a number of combined negative effects, including slower  
 
- 52 -
economic growth, undiversified pension portfolios, and lower rates of return for all 
participants.  Therefore, success in generating the potential positive effects of a pension 
reform on savings, investment, and capital market development, will also depend on 
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APPENDIX A  
Methodology for Estimating the Sources of Growth of Pension Fund Assets 
  In the absence of detailed information on the cash flow of mandatory pension 
funds, the sources of the growth of pension fund assets relative to GDP were estimated 
through information on asset stocks, rates of return, and fees.
32  
 
  Equation (1) shows the changes in the ratio of mandatory pension fund assets, A, 






















































Moreover, fA   - rA      cwM     A
.
+ = , where c is the rate of contribution to the second 
pillar, w is the average covered wage, M is the number of contributors to the second pillar, 
r is the nominal rate of return, and f captures total fees expressed as a share of assets.  
Ideally, these components would be directly obtained through the consolidated cash-flow 
of second pillar pension funds, but this is not available in Hungary.  There is information 
on the flows of contributions to the second pillar but not on the other components.  These 
components were estimated through information on stocks, rates of return, and fees. 
 
The methodology involves computing the integral of the terms between 
parentheses on the right hand side of (1) assuming constant fees and exponential growth 
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32 The methodology for estimating flows from data on stocks, interest rates, fees and other relevant 
variables is explained in more detail in Rocha and Saldanha (1995).   
33 Rates of return were initially assumed to be constant, but this resulted in some differences with the actual 
changes in the ratio of pension assets to GDP, especially in 2004.  These differences were probably due to 
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APPENDIX B  
A General Framework for Comparing Fees During the Accumulation Phase  
This appendix provides a general framework for comparing 5 different types of fees 
during the accumulation phase in individual accounts in terms of compensating variations.  
We will present the simpler case with no interruption in service and simulate later the 
more general case with interruptions in service. 
The General Set-up 
Take an individual with wage w0 at the start of his career and constant (for simplicity) 
wage growth wg for the rest of his career until retirement age T.  In continuous time, his 
wage trajectory is given by: 
 
wgs
s e w w 0 =   (B.1) 
The contribution rate on these earnings is c and two different types of front load fees are 
charged: a fee f1, proportional to gross contributions and a flat dollar fee f2.  Net 
contributions at time t are therefore given by: 
  2 1) 1 ( f f c w nc s s − − =  ( B.2) 
which we assume to be positive all the time.  Net contributions accumulate at a gross rate 
of return of r minus two types of fees: an asset manager performance fee f3, proportional 
to the gross rate of return, and an asset management fee f4, proportional to total assets 
under management.  Hence, contributions accumulate until retirement time T at a net rate 
of return nr = r(1 – f3) – f4.  Finally, an exit fee f5, proportional to the accumulated 
balances at retirement, is also charged. 
No Interruptions in Service 
With no interruptions in service the individual accumulation is given by: 
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The substitution for (B.1) and (B.2) into (B.3) yields: 
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T
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that can be re-arranged into: 
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This form has the intuitive interpretation that with no interruption of service both the flat 
fee and the contribution fee are collected during the whole career of an individual. 
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We will exclude the possibility of the trivial zero net rate of return (the third and fourth 
cases) and focus only on the first two cases in (B.7). 
Total Differential of A(F,c,T) with no Interruption in Service. 
In order analyze the relative impact of the five types of fee on final cash balance we 
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 ( B.10) 
When wg = nr > 0 we use l’Hôpital’s rule on (B.10) and the total differential is given by: 
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 and we know that  x e
x > −1  ∀ x ≠ 0.  This 
is reassuring: fees indeed reduce accumulated balances. 
Equation (B.10) allows us to compare the five different types of fee in the case of no 
interruption in service.  In order to allow for more flexibility, we will first expand the set-
up to the case of interruption in service and compare fees in that more general framework.  
The case of no interruption in service will be a sub-case of the more general set-up where 
the length of the contribution phase coincides with the length career history of the 
individual. 
Interruption in Service 
The easiest way to model interruption in service is by assuming that all time spend 
outside the labor force takes place before or after contribution phase but before retirement.  
The assumption that all leisure time takes place before the contribution phase is trivial.  If 
T = 40 (say) for a full career individual, the assumption that all leisure time takes place 
before the contribution phase simply implies that T < 40 in (B.7) and our results would 
not change.  The assumption that all leisure time takes place after the contribution phase 
but before retirement is more interesting as it allows for accumulation of account 
balances over a period with zero contributions.  The assumption overestimates the value 
of final cash balances compared to a situation where interruption of services are scattered 
along the contribution phase.  This distorts the relationship between fees by an order of  
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magnitude that is proportional to the difference in accumulated balances between the 
assumed scenario and the true state of the world. 
For sake of simplicity we will consider only the case where all leisure time (interruption 
of service) takes place after the contribution phase: i.e., after 0 < T
* < T.  The final cash 
balance at retirement T has two components: 1) the cash balance A
* = A(F,c,T
*) at the end 
of the contribution phase [0,T
*] with the accrued interests on such cash balance during the 
off service period [T
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This rearrangement highlights the fact that the flat fee f2 is levied during the full career of 
the individual and irrespectively on whether the individual contributes or not to his 
individual account. 
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Notice that A
* ≤ A ∀ T
* ≤ T.  We will again exclude the possibility of the trivial zero net 
rate of return (the third and fourth cases) and focus only on the first two cases. 
Total Differential of A*(F,c,T
*,T) with Interruption in Service 
Similarly to the previous section, we calculate the total differential for the first two cases 
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* ≤ T and i ≠ 2.  In other words, with interruptions in service 
fees have a smaller impact on the final cash balance as: either fees are not paid while 
individuals are not in service, or proportional fees are levied on smaller balances.  The 
flat fee has the same impact on cash balances, whether there are interruptions or not, as it 
is levied irrespectively on whether the individual contributes or not until retirement. 
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Simulating the Relationship Among Fees 
From what developed earlier, it is clear that the relationship among different types of fees 
will depend on a series of factors like wage growth, years of contribution, contribution 
rate, gross rate of return and initial salary levels.  Furthermore, the relationship will also 
depend on the level of each fee.  Hence, for sake of simplicity, we analyze here the 
relationship between two individual fees at a time assuming that all remaining fees are set 
to zero and for a given plausible set of the other parameters. 
The following table simulates the percentage change in the fees listed in the top row that 
is required to keep the cash balance constant when the fees listed in the first column 
increase by one percent, when the net rate of return on assets is allowed to vary up to 20.  
As we have assumed that all fees are set to zero, the net rate of return coincides with the 
gross rate of return.  In the simulations we also assumed an initial wage w0 of 1, a  
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contribution charge c of 15%, a wage growth wg of 5%, a career history T of 40 years and 
a contribution period T
* of 35 years. 
Several interesting observations can be made in Table 23 which we analyze top to bottom, 
starting with the first column. 
The relationship between a fee on contributions (f1) and a flat fee (f2) is depicted in the 
first cell of the first column of Table 23.  An increase in one cent in the flat fee is 
compensated by a decrease of the contribution fee that varies in our specific case between 
2 and 5.  The compensating variation is larger the higher is the interest rate.  The intuition 
behind this is that the future value of the flat fee is only a function of the retirement age 
and the rate of return.  However, the future value of the contributions to the fund is also a 
function of the wage growth.  The higher the interest rate the larger the compensating 
change in the contribution fee needs to be.  However, the higher the wage growth, the 
lower the compensating variation needs to be.  The relationship between the two fees 
when wage growth and interest rates are allowed to change is reported in Table 24.  
Notice also that the relationship between the two fees is also a function of the initial wage 
and the contribution rate.  In the simpler case where T
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The higher the initial wage or the contribution rate the lower is the required compensating 
variation.  The same intuition can be used to explain the impact of wage growth, initial 
wage and contribution rate: for a given increase in the flat fee a progressively smaller 
compensating variation in the contribution fee is required if the contribution base is 
allowed to increase.  Notice that all relationships involving the flat fee will be function of 
the specific initial wage chosen.  Hence, contrary to the relationships not involving the 
flat fee, they cannot be easily generalized. 
The relationship between the contribution fee (f1) and the performance fee (f3) is depicted 
in the second cell of the first column of Table 23.  An increase in 1 in the contribution fee 
can be compensated in our specific case with a decrease in the performance fee that is 
directly proportional to the interest rate.  Obviously, when rates are zero, there is no need 
to compensate any change in the performance fee: any chosen level in the performance 
fee would not have any effect on final cash balances.  However, the higher the interest 
rate, the stronger the impact of an increase in the performance fee, and therefore, the 
larger is the required compensating variation in the contribution fee.  Table 24 reports 
data on the relationship between the two fees when both wage growth and interest rates 
are allowed to change.  It is easy to see that wage growth essentially compensates for 
interest rate increases.  For any given level of interest rates, an increase in wage growth 
would reduce the required magnitude of the compensating variation in the contribution 
fee.   
To see this, simply take the simpler case where T















 ( B.19)  
 
- 63 -
The relationship between the contribution fee (f1) and the asset management fee (f4) is 
depicted in the third cell of the first column of Table 23.  It is often quoted that a 1 asset 
management fee is more or less equivalent to a 20 contribution fee over for a full career 
individual.  The next two tables provide further insight on this statement.  The 
compensating variation in the contribution fee is a positive function of the interest rate.  
The intuition is simple: the higher the interest rate the higher is the impact on final cash 
balances of an increase in the asset management fee and therefore, the higher is the 
required compensating variation in the contribution fee.  Table 24 reports data on the 
relationship between the two fees when both wage growth and interest rates are allowed 
to change.  The higher the wage growth the smaller is the required compensating 
variation in the contribution fee for any given increase in the asset management fee.  For 
a full career individual (T
* = T) this varies from minus 13 in a high wage growth and low 
interest rate environment to minus 28 in a low wage growth and a high interest rate 
environment.  What is interesting is that wage growth and interest rate have an identical 
but opposite impact on the compensating variation.  This can be inferred from the 
constant elements on the diagonal of the relevant matrices in Table 24 or by casual 
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The relationship between the contribution fee (f1) and the end of period fee (f5) is constant 






 ( B.21) 
The rationale for this is that the present value of the end of period fee is equal to the 
present value of the contribution fees levied each year during the contributing history of 
an individual.  Alternatively, the future value of the contribution fees levied each year 
during the contributing history of an individual is the end of period fee.  In other words 
df1 = df5.  Notice that this is true only in the absence of a flat fee.  This particular 
relationship will facilitate the analysis of the relationships of all other fees with the end of 
the period fee in the last paragraph of this section. - 64 - 
 
Table 23: Comparative statics of fee relationship when net rate of return is allowed to change 
  1 f   2 f   3 f   4 f  
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Note: wg = 5%, T = 40, T
* = 35, c = 15%, w0 = 1, F = 0 which implies that nr = r. 
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The relationship between the flat fee (f2) and the performance fee (f3) is depicted in the 
second cell of the second column of Table 23 and it is similar to the relationship between 
the flat fee and the contribution fee previously described.  The future value of the flat fee 
is only a function of the retirement age and the rate of return.  However, the future value 
of the contributions to the fund is also a function of the wage growth, contribution rate 
and initial wage.  For zero interest rate, no matter what performance fee is charged, its 
impact will be null and therefore the compensating variation is zero.  For higher levels of 
interest rate the compensating variation will increase proportionally and it will be higher 
the higher is the contribution base (initial wage, wage growth, and contribution rate).  
The joint effect of interest rate and wage growth is reported in Table 24. 
The relationship between the flat fee (f2) and the asset management fee (f4) is depicted in 
the third cell of the second column of Table 23.  For low levels of net rate of return the 
relationship is negative: i.e., higher levels of asset management fee can be compensated 
with higher levels (in absolute terms) of flat fee.  For high levels of net rate of return the 
relationship is positive: i.e., higher levels of asset management fee can be compensated 
with lower levels (in absolute terms) of flat fee.   
Table 24: Comparative statics of fee relationship 
       T* = 30      T* = 35      T* = 40   
       r   r    r  
    ()  3 6 9 3 6 9 3 6 9 
    2  12.91 28.89 68.82 14.71 31.14 71.66 16.42 32.99 73.66 
A*  wg  5  20.47 42.86 95.91 25.24 48.83  103.40 30.52 54.51  109.53 
    8  34.68 67.97  142.28 47.36 83.81  162.12 63.64  101.32  180.99 
    2  -5.99 -5.78 -5.75 -5.26 -5.36 -5.52 -4.71 -5.06 -5.37 
-df1/df2  wg  5  -3.78 -3.90 -4.12 -3.06 -3.42 -3.83 -2.53 -3.06 -3.61 
    8  -2.23 -2.46 -2.78 -1.63 -1.99 -2.44 -1.22 -1.65 -2.19 
    2  -0.77 -1.68 -2.69 -0.71 -1.59 -2.61 -0.64 -1.51 -2.55 
-df1/df3  wg  5  -0.71 -1.54 -2.51 -0.61 -1.41 -2.38 -0.52 -1.28 -2.26 
    8  -0.64 -1.41 -2.32 -0.53 -1.23 -2.12 -0.41 -1.04 -1.92 
   2  -25.75 -27.93 -29.90 -23.52 -26.46 -29.02 -21.33 -25.12 -28.30 
-df1/df4  wg  5  -23.51 -25.75 -27.93 -20.47 -23.52 -26.46 -17.36 -21.33 -25.12 
   8  -21.38 -23.51 -25.75 -17.64 -20.47 -23.52 -13.74 -17.36 -21.33 
    2  -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
-df1/df5  wg  5  -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
    8  -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
    2  -0.13 -0.29 -0.47 -0.13 -0.30 -0.47 -0.14 -0.30 -0.47 
-df2/df3  wg  5  -0.19 -0.40 -0.61 -0.20 -0.41 -0.62 -0.21 -0.42 -0.63 
    8  -0.29 -0.57 -0.83 -0.32 -0.62 -0.87 -0.34 -0.63 -0.88 
    2  -4.30 -4.83 -5.20 -4.47 -4.93 -5.26 -4.53 -4.96 -5.27 
-df2/df4  wg  5  -6.22 -6.61 -6.77 -6.68 -6.87 -6.92 -6.85 -6.96 -6.96 
    8  -9.59 -9.56 -9.26  -10.80  -10.27 -9.64  -11.31  -10.53 -9.76 
   2  -33.33 -16.67 -11.11 -33.33 -16.67 -11.11 -33.33 -16.67 -11.11 
-df3/df4  wg  5 -33.33 -16.67 -11.11 -33.33 -16.67 -11.11 -33.33 -16.67 -11.11 
   8 -33.33 -16.67 -11.11 -33.33 -16.67 -11.11 -33.33 -16.67 -11.11 
Note: w0 = 1, c = 15, F = 0, T = 40. 
Finally, the relationship between the performance fee (f3) and the asset management fee 
(f4) is depicted in the third cell of the third column of Table 23.  A one percent increase in 
the asset management fee corresponds to a percentage change in the performance fee that 
is equal to the inverse of the interest rate.  Like all other relationships not involving the 
flat fee this specific relationship is not affected by the level of initial wage or contribution 
rate.  In addition, it is not affected by wage growth.  The intuition behind this is easy to 
explain by noticing that the two fees affect the net rate of return nr only.  The 
compensating variation of one fee w.r.t.  the other fee needs to keep nr constant in order - 67 - 
 
to have a neutral impact on the end of period cash balance.  Therefore, the compensating 





3 − = . (B.22) 
Notice we have not discussed the any relationship involving the end of period fee (f5) 
with the exception of the relationship between the end of period fee and the contribution 




df i i =  ∀ i and hence, 
the inverse of what discussed above applies to the relationship between any of the fees 
here presented and the end of period fee. - 68 - 
 
APPENDIX C  
The Charge Ratio 
This appendix details the calculations of the charge ratio.  It uses the notation developed 
in APPENDIX B. 
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The accumulation ratio is given by: 
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The charge ratio is given by: 
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APPENDIX D  
 
return calculations as measures of performance. 
Dollar Weighted Rate of Return 
The dollar weighted rate of return, or internal rate of return (IRR), is a methodology 
widely used until some thirty years ago to calculate performance.  The IRR is related to 
the present value of a future stream of income: indeed it is the value of the discount rate 
that equates present value with future values of cash flows at different point in time.  















s e V e C V  ( D.1) 
where V0 is the value of the fund at the beginning of the period, Ci is the i-th cash flow 
(positive or negative) in or out of the fund during the period, Vn + 1 is the value of the fund 
at the end of the period, ti is the time in years from the beginning of the period until the i-
th cash flow, and r is the IRR. 
Notice that since the end of period portfolio value Vn + 1 is a function of Ci, the IRR will 
also be a function of Ci.  In other words, the IRR has the problem that it is affected by the 
value, number and timing of cash flows that should have nothing to do with performance 
of the asset or the manager managing it. 
Time Weighted Rates of Return 
Due to this major shortcoming of the IRR a move towards time weighted measures of 
rate of return was put forward by the Bank Administration Institute (BAI) in 1968.  While 
the IRR reconciles the present value with future values, including cash flows, time 
weighted returns ignore cash flows and only consider the money in the fund during the 
period.  Here different methods have been proposed: 
The Linked IRR 
The Linked IRR calls 1) for dividing the period for which the rate of return is to be 
calculated into sub-periods where cash flows serve as sub-period boundaries, 2) valuing 
the portfolio in each sub-period; 3) compute the IRR for each sub-period; and 4) 
geometrically link the IRRs for each sub-period to obtain a time weighted rate of return 
for the whole period.  Although, technically correct, this method has the disadvantage 
that the portfolio market value at the beginning and the ending of each sub-period has to 
be known, as well as the timing and value of each cash flow. 
The ICAA RR 
The Investment Counsel Association of America ICAA rate of return simplifies the 
process of treating cash flows by focusing only on the beginning and end of the period - 70 - 
 
values of the portfolio, net total cash flows including income and reinvested income.  The 











r  (D.2) 
where BMV is the value of the portfolio at the beginning of the period, EMV is the value 
of the portfolio at the end of the period, NC is the net cash flow within the period (from 
any source including reinvestment income), I is the total income within the period and r is 
the ICAA rate of return.  The formula has the following three obvious shortcomings. 
The formula assumes that between the beginning and the end of the period the market 
value of the portfolio changes linearly, clearly an approximation. 
The formula ignores the timing of cash flows and therefore it is only an approximation of 
the true time weighted rate of return.  In fact  2
NC  in the formula has the effect of 
“allocating” cash flows equally to the beginning and the end of the period.  In other 
words, the formula assumes that all cash flows take place in the middle of the period 
under valuation.  Hence, irrespectively of when contributions to a pension funds are made, 
these are assumed to be in the fund only 15 days per month (say). 
The formula also treats reinvested income as a cash flow when this is not the case.  
Indeed, unless income is redistributed, it remains in the fund and should be considered 
appreciation of the end of period value of the portfolio.  In other words, while cash flows 
should not affect performance, appreciation should.  In the formula 50 of the income 
“appreciates” the end of the period value of the portfolio while re-invested income 
appreciates the beginning of the period value of the portfolio.  This approximation is 
acceptable only when reinvested income is in the neighborhood of zero.  In order to see 
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where NC  is now the true net cash flow for the period excluding reinvested income and 


















the sign of which is determined by the first factor.  When EMV > BMV the formula 
underestimates the rate of return and when EMV < BMV the formula overestimates the - 71 - 
 
rate of return.  Furthermore, the error increases with the value of total income within the 









The Dietz RR 
The Dietz rate of return (Kirschman and Dietz, 1983) addresses the second shortcoming 
above mentioned: i.e., the lack of separation between cash flows and reinvested income.  











r  (D.5) 
which still assumes that cash flows occur at the middle of the period and does not address 
the problem of the linear change in the market value of the portfolio. 
The Modified Dietz RR 
Kirschman and Dietz recognize the shortcoming of ignoring the timing of the cash flows 
by proposing to day-weight cash flows to address the problem of all midpoint methods.  
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where Ci is the cash flow (positive or negative) in or out of the portfolio and wi is the 
proportion of days in the period that the cash flow has been in or out of the portfolio. 
Day weighting has an ambiguous impact on the rate of return relatively to what produced 
by the Dietz formula.  When EMV > BMV, (D.6) will be higher (lower) than (D.5) if wi is 
lower (higher) than 0.5.  When EMV < BMV , (D.6) will be lower (higher) than (D.5) if wi 








.  The intuition behind this is that when EMV > BMV, by ignoring the extra 
amount of time that the money has spent in (out) of the fund, (D.5) underestimates 
(overestimates) performance. 
The modified Dietz RR still assumes that the market value of the fund changes linearly 
within the period.   
The Unit Value Method 
The unit value method allows us to obtain true time weighted rate of returns.  With this 
method the value of the fund at the beginning of the period is used as a base for all the 
calculations.  Cash flows and changes in asset value are reflected in changes in the base 
value.  Performance is then calculated by geometrically chain linking the rate of return - 72 - 
 
calculated for any change in the base value.  In order to adopt this methodology, the fund 
needs to be revalued before and after every cash flow.  Furthermore, since the base value 
at any time is a function of all the changes in the base value since the beginning of the 
period, any adjustment made to early entries would require a re-calculation of all rates of 
return after the adjustment is made. 
The calculation of the rate of return using the unit value method is simply the ratio of the 
end of period base value over the beginning of period base value: 
  1 − =
BBV
EBV
r  (D.7) 
Comparing the Different Methodologies 
A simple example (which we call “Case A”, for simplicity), reported in the following 
table, allows us to compare the different methodologies presented before. 
Table 25: Comparing RR methodologies – Case A 
Number 
of Days 
Mkt.  Value  Change in 
Mkt.  Value 
Income Cash  Flow Number 
of Units 
Base Value 
1 $250,000        1000.00  250.000 
5 $276,000  $25,000  $1,000    1000.00  276.000 
7 $326,000      $50,000  1181.16  276.000 
15 $327,000  $1,000      1181.16  276.847 
20 $321,500  -$500    -$5,000  1163.10  276.417 
30 $320,500  -$1,000      1163.10  275.557 
 
The fund has an initial position of US$250 thousand which corresponds to 1000 
units and a base value of 250.  After five days there is a change in market value of US$25 
thousand, due to revaluation of underlying assets (say), and income of US$ 1000.  The 
number of units does not change and the base value changes as the market value has 
appreciated.  After 7 days there is a positive cash flow (contribution) of US$50 thousand.  
This does not change the base value but increases the number of units by around 181, 
bought at the most recent available price 276.  (Alternatively one can imagine that 
valuation is made on a daily basis and that the market value has not changed between day 
5 and 6).  After 15 days we have another market value appreciation that has the same 
impact of US$1 thousand.  This has no impact on the number of units but it increases the 
base value.  After day 20 we have a minor depreciation and a negative cash flow of US$5 
thousand.  These reduce both the number of units and the base value.  A final 
depreciation of US$1 thousand on the last day of the period further reduces the base 
value.  The following table reports the result of the different rate of return calculations. 
Table 26: Comparing RR methodologies – Case A 
IRR ICAA Dietz  MDietz  Unit  Value 
8.531% 9.725% 9.358% 9.871%  10.223% 
 - 73 - 
 
The calculated rate is around 10.2% given essentially by the US$25 thousand 
realized in day 5 but the approximations of the true time weighted rate of return (TWRR) 
method can deviate substantially from the 10.2% due to the presence of large cash flows. 
It is then interesting to investigate how large the cash flows need to be in order to 
make the TWRR approximations too inferior w.r.t. the unit value method.  For such a 
purpose we have set up the following 4 artificial cases, a simplified version of “Case A” 
before described. 
•  Case B: Price appreciation of 10% on day 15 (mid month) and large (> 10%) 
cash flow at the beginning of the month. 
•  Case C: Price appreciation of 10% on day 15 (mid month) and large (> 10%) 
cash flow at the end of the month. 
•  Case D: Price appreciation of 10% on day 15 (mid month) and small (< 10%) 
cash flow at the beginning of the month. 
•  Case E: Price appreciation of 10% on day 15 (mid month) and small (< 10%) 
cash flow at the end of the month. 
The data for these cases are reported in the next 4 tables. 
Table 27: Comparing RR methodologies – Case B 
Number 
of Days 
Mkt.  Value  Change in 
Mkt.  Value 
Income Cash  Flow Number 
of Units 
Base Value 
1 $250,000        1000.00  250.000 
2 $330,000      $80,000  1320.00  250.000 
7 $330,000        1320.00  250.000 
15 $363,000  $33,000      1320.00  275.000 
29 $363,000        1320.00  275.000 
30 $363,000        1320.00  275.000 
 
Table 28: Comparing RR methodologies – Case C 
Number 
of Days 
Mkt.  Value  Change in 
Mkt.  Value 
Income Cash  Flow Number 
of Units 
Base Value 
1 $250,000        1000.00  250.000 
2 $250,000        1000.00  250.000 
7 $250,000        1000.00  250.000 
15 $275,000  $25,000      1000.00  275.000 
29 $355,000      $80,000  1290.91  275.000 
30 $355,000        1290.91  275.000 
 
Table 29: Comparing RR methodologies – Case D 
Number 
of Days 
Mkt.  Value  Change in 
Mkt.  Value 
Income Cash  Flow Number 
of Units 
Base Value 
1 $250,000        1000.00  250.000 
2 $262,000      $12,000  1048.00  250.000 
7 $262,000        1048.00  250.000 
15 $288,200  $26,200      1048.00  275.000 
29 $288,200        1048.00  275.000 
30 $288,200        1048.00  275.000 - 74 - 
 
 
Table 30: Comparing RR methodologies – Case E 
Number 
of Days 
Mkt.  Value  Change in 
Mkt.  Value 
Income Cash  Flow Number 
of Units 
Base Value 
1 $250,000        1000.00  250.000 
2 $250,000        1000.00  250.000 
7 $250,000        1000.00  250.000 
15 $275,000  $25,000      1000.00  275.000 
29 $287,000      $12,000  1043.64  275.000 
30 $287,000        1043.64  275.000 
 
The following table compares the rate of return calculations in these four cases. 
Table 31: Comparing RR methodologies – Case B – E 
Case IRR  ICAA  Dietz  MDietz  Unit  Value 
B  9.687% 11.379% 11.379% 12.924%  10.000% 
C  9.439%  8.621% 8.621% 7.637%  10.000% 
D  9.560% 10.234% 10.234% 10.447%  10.000% 
E  9.517%  9.766% 9.766% 9.557%  10.000% 
 
When net cash flows are large and take place before the (positive) change in asset 
value, the true TWRR approximations substantially overestimate the unit value method.  
In Case B the cash flow is 32% the market value of the portfolio and the overestimation 
of the Dietz modified formula is around 300 basis points.  When net cash flows are large 
and take place after the (positive) change in asset value, the true TWRR approximations 
substantially underestimates the unit value method.  When cash flows are small and take 
place before the (positive) change in asset value, the true TWRR approximations only 
marginally overestimates the unit value method.  In Case D the cash flow is 4.8% of the 
market value of the portfolio and the overestimation is of the Dietz modified formula is 
around 44 basis points.   
In general, the error made in using approximations of the unit value method 
increases with the distance in time between the cash flow and the realization of the 
change in asset value.  It is smallest when the two events coincide.  Finally the error tends 
to zero when the asset base increases relatively to the size of cash flows. 
 